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What Judges Say and Do in Deciding National Security Cases: 
The Example of the State Secrets Privilege 
 
Jane is an American success story.1  Born in the United States to immigrant parents from 
the Middle East, she and her parents embraced the American dream.  She was a gifted student 
who received scholarships to attend the most selective schools and ultimately earned her 
doctorate degree in electrical engineering from MIT, followed by prestigious, government 
funded fellowships.  Eventually, she was hired by a major government contractor to work on 
highly sensitive military contracts and received the necessary security clearances for that work. 
Jane also has a much less accomplished younger brother, who over the years became 
politically active and disaffected.  A few years ago, he severed ties with his family and is 
believed to be living outside the United States.  Jane has attempted with limited success to 
communicate with him over the years. 
One day, Jane is called to the office of her supervisor and told that her security clearance 
had been revoked and as a result, her employment terminated, effective immediately.  Jane asks 
for an explanation, but is told that the Company is not in a position to provide the reasons for her 
termination other than her lack of the required security clearance.  She assumes from what is said 
that the revocation of her security clearance and termination is government initiated and directed. 
She tries to fly home to be with her family and finds out that she is on the No Fly List and cannot 
fly on a commercial airline. She also learns over the next several weeks that she has been 
identified within the military contractor community as a security risk and becomes essentially 
unemployable. 
1 The facts of this hypothetical case are not taken from any past or pending case, but rather reflect aspects of cases in 
which the state secrets privilege has been asserted.  See, e.g., Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(plaintiff, a top rated candidate for the FBI, was not hired for reasons protected under the state secrets privilege); 
Doe v. C.I.A., 576 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2009) (state secrets privilege was asserted with respect to the reasons a CIA 
employee was “summarily separated” and “terminated immediately” from the CIA). 
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Jane can think of nothing in her own background or activities that would justify her 
treatment but assumes it has something to do with her brother.  She therefore approaches the 
United States government about how she can prove that she is a loyal American and respond to 
any derogatory information it may have, all without any substantive response. 
Finally, Jane files a lawsuit against the Company for wrongful discharge, defamation, and 
various economic torts.  She serves interrogatories, document requests, and a Rule 30(b)(6) 
deposition notice in order to find out why she was terminated, what information the Company 
relied on to terminate her, and what information has been disseminated about her.  The Company 
refuses to provide any information and seeks a protective order. 
The United States intervenes and asserts the state secrets privilege with respect to any of 
the information or documents that Jane has requested in the lawsuit.  It files a public, redacted 
declaration, and also an unredacted version, ex parte under seal, from a high ranking official of 
the CIA in charge of counterterrorism, stating that the requested information, if disclosed, would 
endanger national security as well as sources and methods pertaining to the gathering of sensitive 
intelligence and national security information.  It also files a declaration from the Attorney 
General which says that she has personally reviewed the information and documents requested 
and agrees that its disclosure would endanger national security.  The government wants the case 
dismissed immediately with no discovery and no further disclosure to Jane or the district court. 
This paper explores how judges act when confronted with the issues raised in Jane’s case 
and what considerations and objectives influence judges in the exercise of the considerable 
discretion they have in such a case.2   
2 Because the purpose of this paper is to analyze judicial conduct rather than the substance of legal holdings, it does 
not attempt to inventory the overall number of cases or judges holding any particular view, but rather surveys the 
range and typicality of those views.  Similarly, the paper does not attempt to analyze in any significant way the 
many substantial and unsettled constitutional issues bound up with the state secrets privilege, except to the extent 
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Introduction 
Since 1953, following the seminal case of United States v. Reynolds,3 courts have faced 
broad claims of executive authority in the name of national defense, including the state secrets 
privilege.  Judges have responded in a variety of ways, from nearly complete deference to a 
demanding and searching inquiry.  Particularly since 9/11, the debate over the proper role of the 
judiciary has been fueled, in part, by the assertion of such claims in an increasingly broad range 
of cases brought both by and against the government, either directly or against private actors 
involved with national defense.4  These cases go well beyond those pertaining strictly to military 
intelligence and extend to such matters as physical detentions, warrantless surveillance, 
restrictions on travel, FOIA requests, asset seizures, contract disputes, patent infringement 
claims, immigration and denaturalization proceedings, defamation claims, negligence and 
products liability claims, and employment discrimination claims.5 
As a matter of procedure, the Executive Branch typically supports a state secrets claim 
with a sworn declaration from a high-ranking official, with varying degrees of supporting detail, 
identifying the categories into which the substance of the protected information falls, such as 
“covert operative or cooperating witness,” “sources and methods” or “sensitive ongoing 
investigation,” and claiming that if disclosed, the information would endanger national security. 
The Executive Branch has recently given assurances that the privilege would be asserted 
that they bear on judges’ approaches and dispositions in a particular case.  For these reasons, the author has 
considered dicta as well as holdings, including those reversed or modified on appeal, and concurring and dissenting, 
as well as majority, appellate opinions. 
3 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
4 There were six published opinions concerning assertions of the state secrets privilege between 1954 and 1973, 
sixty-five published opinions between 1973 and 2001, and twenty-six between 2002 and June 2008.  See Robert M. 
Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1298 (2007) 
(Chart 1 - Published Opinions in State-Secrets Cases (1954-2006)); Michael H. Page, Judging without the Facts: A 
Schematic for Reviewing State Secrets Privilege Claims, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1243, 1253, n.84 (2008). 
5 See generally Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77 (2010) (providing 
inventory and summary of cases in which the state secrets privilege has been  judicially considered); 8 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE §§ 2367–79 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961) (discussing the common law pertaining to the state secrets 
privilege); Chesney, supra (providing an overall history of the state secrets privilege).  
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sparingly and only after high level Department of Justice review,6 but the need for judicial 
oversight has been underscored by disclosures over the years that Executive Branch justifications 
based on national security may have been overstated or, in fact, baseless. For example, in the late 
1990s, after declassification of the investigation report at issue in Reynolds, there has been 
substantial debate over whether the Executive Branch accurately represented to the judiciary the 
substance of that report.7  In May 2011, the Solicitor General of the United States “confessed 
error” in the Korematsu case on the grounds that by the time the case had reached the Supreme 
Court, “the solicitor general had learned of a key intelligence report that undermined the 
rationale behind the internment.”8 
As discussed below, the United States Supreme Court has aggressively and repeatedly 
asserted the judiciary’s constitutional right and obligation to review assertions of the state secrets 
privilege. On the other hand, it counsels that judges should not quickly second guess the 
“predictive judgments” that are infused into those claims.  Rather, the extent of a court’s inquiry 
into the factual basis for a state secrets claim should be governed by a litigant’s showing of 
“necessity” and “[w]here there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim should not be lightly 
accepted.” With that measure in mind, a judge should probe until “satisf[ied] . . . from all the 
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will 
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”  
6 See Memorandum from Attorney General to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Policies and 
Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege, (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
documents/state-secret-345privileges.pdf. 
7 See Louis Fisher, In the Name of National Security: Unchecked Presidential Power and the Reynolds Case (2006); 
see also Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting the claim that the United States had 
committed “fraud on the court” through its characterization of the investigation report in Reynolds); Mohamed v. 
Jeppensen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
8 Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment 
Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-
mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases. 
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Once a judge is “satisfied” that information is covered by the state secrets privilege, 
“even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is 
ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake;” and a judge must then decide whether the 
claims can be adjudicated.  If the “subject matter” of the claim itself is a state secret, or the 
plaintiff or defendant is unable to prove its case or defenses without the privileged information or 
risking disclosure of privileged information, a judge should dismiss the claim.9 
The Supreme Court’s formulation of the state secrets privilege requires a judge in all 
instances to consider the following core issues: (1) whether the privilege is properly invoked 
procedurally; (2) the level of inquiry into the basis for any privilege; and (3) the consequences to 
the litigation as a result of a recognized state secrets privilege.  But Reynolds and subsequent 
Supreme Court cases leave open a wide range of issues. How does a judge decide whether there 
is a “reasonable danger” associated with a disclosure of information or whether military matters 
“should not be divulged,” under any circumstances or protective measures, even at the expense 
of a substantial meritorious claim? What would be an acceptable level of risk in order to allow 
for an adjudication of a claim?  How direct or immediate, or conversely, how remote, 
speculative, or attenuated, must a risk be before it falls outside the bounds of a “reasonable” 
danger?  To what extent and in what fashion may a litigant’s counsel participate in the process of 
evaluating the invocation of the privilege?  How are a judge’s duty of inquiry and a litigant’s 
right of access to the courts to be reconciled or accommodated with the “absolute” nature of 
privileged information, no matter how marginally protected?  Are there alternatives to outright 
dismissal that would adequately protect privileged information while allowing the use of non-
privileged information, such as those procedures used in criminal cases under the Classified 
9 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-11. 
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Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. III. §§ 1-16 (“CIPA”), including summaries, 
redactions, and the use of cleared counsel?10  
As a practical matter, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, and the conflicting values 
reflected in them, have essentially sanctioned an inquiry into assertions of the state secrets 
privilege as much or as little as a judge deems appropriate.  It is therefore not surprising that, as 
the Supreme Court expected, the lower courts have dealt with these issues in a variety of ways. 
Some judges read Reynolds and other Supreme Court authority as restricting narrowly their 
ability to look behind the assertion of the privilege.  They emphasize that while there can be no 
abdication of judicial oversight, a trial judge, in the first instance, should accord considerable 
deference to Executive Branch judgments and recommendations.  They see courts “ill-equipped 
to become steeped in foreign intelligence matters” and the Executive Branch as occupying “a 
position superior to that of the courts in evaluating the consequences of a release of sensitive 
information.”11 They emphasize the Reynolds principle that “even the most compelling 
necessity” cannot overcome the obligation to protect state secrets information.12  They rely on 
statutory mandates to bolster claims of state secrets privilege,13 and have shown no disposition to 
find alternatives to dismissal when privileged subject matter is centrally involved in a claim.14 
Other judges find in Reynolds not only wide discretion to probe into the factual basis for 
the privilege but also an obligation to engage in a more intrusive inquiry.  These judges 
10 For an overview of how judges have handled classified information in national security cases under CIPA and 
otherwise, see Robert Timothy Reagan, Fed. Judicial Ctr., National Security Case Studies: Specialty Case-
Management Challenges (June 25, 2013), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/TS130625.pdf/$file 
/TS130625.pdf.  
11 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-11. 
12 See, e.g., Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 57 (“No competing public or private interest can be advanced to compel 
disclosure.”); In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 476 (noting that “the ‘balance has already been struck’ in favor of 
protecting secrets of state over the interests of a particular litigant.”); Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d 623, 626 (E.D. 
Va. 2000) (“[i]t is not for a court to second-guess the assertion of privilege”); see also Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 
14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Halkin I); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Halkin II); Jabara v. Kelley, 
75 F.R.D. 475, 484 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
13 See, e.g., Tilden, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (E.D. Va. 2000), citing current 50 U.S.C. §§ 3025, 3057. 
14 See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006).  
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emphasize that the privilege is strictly limited to material necessary to prevent injury to national 
security.15  Absent a clear facial showing that the privilege necessarily applies, they see the need 
to review the underlying documents and whenever possible, disentangle privileged from non-
privileged information in order to allow for the use of the latter, including non-privileged 
classified information in certain circumstances.16  They consider the competing interests at stake 
in assessing the effect to be given the privilege on the litigation and will look for alternatives to 
dismissal through procedures intended to preserve the adversarial process as much as possible.17 
In short, judges have been able to find authority for almost any result; and the purpose of 
this paper is to examine how lower court judges have applied the principles and considerations 
laid down by the Supreme Court concerning the state secrets privilege.  Towards that end, the 
paper assesses in Part I the jurisprudence that lower court judges have formulated based on those 
principles and considerations, as it appears in published opinions.18  In Part II, the paper 
considers how judges would actually exercise their broad discretion under that jurisprudence, as 
reflected in interviews with thirty-one federal district and circuit court judges who have been 
involved in varying degrees in national security-related cases, and state secrets cases in 
particular.  Part II also considers whether the jurisprudence formulated by lower court judges 
provides any uniformity in approach or any real constraints on how judges go about dealing with 
state secrets claims.  It also examines briefly whether any particular background or experiences 
appear to correlate with any particular focus or disposition on the part of the interviewed judges.  
15 See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
16 Id. 
17 See, e.g., Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59-60 (D.D.C. 2009). 
18 “Published opinion,” as used here, refers to any decision accessible online or through the national reporter 
systems, rather than only those having precedential value under the rules of a particular Circuit.  The paper has not 
based its analysis and discussion on other available sources reflecting judicial dispositions.  See, e.g., Stephen 
Reinhardt, The Judicial Role in National Security, 86 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1309; T.S. Ellis, National Security Trials: 
A Judge’s Perspective, 90 VA. L. REV. 1607 (2013); Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a 
Time of National Emergency, New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. (2006). 
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Part I: Decided Cases19 
A. The State Secrets Privilege from Burr through Reynolds. 
  
The first recorded judicial consideration in an American court of what could be called the 
states secrets privilege appears to have occurred during the criminal trial of Aaron Burr on 
charges of treason and lesser offenses in 1807.20  In that case, Chief Justice Marshall, presiding 
as a trial judge, considered Burr’s request that a subpoena duces tecum be issued to President 
Jefferson for the original of a letter regarding Burr to the President from General Wilkinson, one 
of Burr’s principle accusers. The government objected to the issuance of the subpoena on the 
grounds, among others, that the subpoenaed letter “might contain state secrets, which could not 
be divulged without endangering the national safety,”21 that the court did not have the “judicial 
competence” to subpoena the President, the “Chief Magistrate,” and that public disclosure of the 
letter would disclose matters “which ought not to be disclosed.”22 Marshall issued the subpoena 
over objections.  Expressing sentiments that have animated all subsequent debates on executive 
privileges, Marshall recognized that the case presented “a delicate question” that balanced Burr’s 
need for the information against whether “the disclosure be unpleasant to the executive.”23  But 
given Burr’s need for the letter, Justice Marshall concluded that refusing to require production of 
19 Approximately 750 federal cases have been found that reference state secrets or the state secrets privilege, 
approximately 150 of which have a substantive discussion useful to this paper.  As reflected in the paper’s case 
citations, despite the large number of cases in which judges have discussed the state secrets privilege, the range of 
attitudes and dispositions are reflected in a relatively small number of cases, and the paper concentrates its citations 
to those that have a particularly detailed or animated discussion. 
20 The more general “Executive privilege” appears to have been first alluded to in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(Cranch) 137, 144-45 (1803).  At the trial in that case, the then Attorney General, who at the time of the events in 
question was acting Secretary of State, asserted that “he was not bound and ought not to answer [questions put to 
him], as to any facts which came officially to his knowledge while acting as secretary of state.”  Without ruling 
specifically on that claim, Chief Justice Marshall observed that the witness was obligated to disclose facts that he 
learned in his official capacity but that “if he thought that anything was communicated to him in confidence [by 
President Adams] he was not bound to disclose it.” 
21 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).  
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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the letter “would tarnish the reputation of the court which had given its sanction to its being 
withheld.”24    
Seventy-one years later, in Totten v. United States, a civil breach of contract action, the 
Supreme Court as a judicial body first considered the state secrets privilege. In its short, four 
paragraph opinion, the Court laid down the principle, much recited in later cases, that “public 
policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would 
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and 
respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.”25  The stated rationale for the 
decision was not so much that the subject matter of the dispute (the espionage contract entered 
into with President Lincoln), if disclosed, would endanger national security (in fact, the nature 
and terms of the secret contract were fully disclosed), 26 but rather that the parties had, in effect, 
contractually agreed to keep secret the contract and the source of payment under the contract, 
such that it would be a breach of contract to allow one party to enforce the contract through the 
public tribunals.27  As discussed below, subsequent Supreme Court cases have substantially 
recast the original holding of Totten into an expansive doctrine of non-justiciability based on 
subject matter rather than any implicit contractual agreement.28   
Following Totten, in fairly conclusory fashion and without extended analysis, a handful 
of lower courts considered what was in substance a state secrets privilege, typically described as 
24 Id. 
25 92 U.S. 105, 107 (U.S. 1875). 
26 The contract at issue was one entered into with William A. Lloyd in July 1861 to spy on behalf of the United 
States and “report the facts to the president; for which services he was to be paid $200 a month.”  Totten, 92 U.S. at 
106. 
27 Id. at 107 (“Much greater reason exists for the application of the principle [of non-disclosure applicable to other 
privileges] to cases of contract for secret services with the government, as the existence of a contract of that kind is 
itself a fact not to be disclosed”).  
28  See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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a “military or national security privilege.”29  Following Totten, and before Reynolds, the 
Supreme Court also touched upon basic separation of powers principles that have shaped its state 
secrets jurisprudence.30  However, the Supreme Court did not again consider the state secrets 
privilege explicitly until 1953, in Reynolds, eighty-two years after Totten, in the midst of the 
Cold War. 
In Reynolds, the plaintiffs, widows of civilian employees killed in the crash of a B-29 
bomber that was “testing secret electric equipment,” brought an action against the Air Force 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.  They sought discovery of an Air Force investigative report 
on the accident and statements provided by surviving members of the airplane’s crew.  The 
district court ordered the government to produce the documents for its review.  The government 
refused; and the district court entered judgment against the government on the issue of liability 
essentially as a Rule 37 discovery sanction.31  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
affirmed.32  As seen by the Third Circuit, the critical fact was that the Federal Tort Claims Act 
waived sovereign immunity; and for that reason the public interest “must yield to what Congress 
evidently regarded as the greater public interest involved in seeing that justice is done to persons 
29 See, e.g., Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912) (involving weapons 
blueprints); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (holding that Navy Board of Investigation 
reports were discoverable since they did not contain military secrets).  See also William V. Sanford, Evidentiary 
Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the Control of Executive Departments, 3 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1950) 
(cited by a number of cases, including the Supreme Court in Reynolds, in which the author references cases dealing 
with the privilege and offers an overall approach to the privilege); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d 
Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.) (“[T]here may be evidence—‘state secrets’—to divulge which will imperil ‘national security’; 
and which the Government cannot, and should not, be required to divulge.  Salus rei publicae suprema lex.  The 
immunity from disclosure of the names or statements of informers is an instance of the same doctrine.  This 
privilege will often impose a grievous hardship, for it may deprive parties to civil actions, or even to criminal 
prosecutions, of power to assert their rights or to defend themselves. That is a consequence of any evidentiary 
privilege.  It is, however, one thing to allow the privileged person to suppress the evidence, and, toto coelo, another 
thing to allow him to fill a gap in his own evidence by recourse to what he suppresses.”). 
30 See Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“The President, both as 
Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports 
neither are nor ought to be published to the world.  It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant 
information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held 
secret.”); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
31 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5-6. 
32 United States v. Reynolds, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951). 
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injured by governmental operations.”33  In that regard, it concluded that “a claim of privilege 
against disclosing evidence relevant to the issues in a pending lawsuit involves a justiciable 
question, traditionally within the competence of the courts, which is to be determined in 
accordance with the appropriate rules of evidence, upon the submission of the documents in 
question to the [district] judge for his examination.” 34  The Court of Appeals also warned that 
the existence of the wide-ranging privilege the government advanced facilitated the 
government’s keeping information secret for the sole purpose of avoiding its own embarrassment 
or liability.35  Overall, it concluded that the district court judge had acted properly when it 
“directed that the documents in question be produced for his personal examination so that he 
might determine whether all or any part of the documents contain . . . matters of a confidential 
nature.”36  It rejected the contention that the claim of privilege was exempt from judicial review, 
but noted that “such examination must obviously be ex parte and in camera if the privilege is not 
to be lost in its assertion.”37   
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s affirmance of the district court, and in 
the process, settled certain issues and adopted for the first time a methodology for assessing the 
“well-established” evidentiary privilege “against revealing military secrets,”38 albeit one with 
which “[j]udicial experience . . . has been limited.”39  Like the Third Circuit, it rejected the 
contention that “the executive department heads have the power to withhold any document in 
their custody from judicial review if they deem it to be in the public interest,”40 recognizing that 
in light of the competing interests and “[r]egardless of how it is articulated, some . . . formula of 
33 Id. at 994. 
34 Id. at 997.  
35 Id. at 995. 
36 Id. at 996. 
37 Id. at 997. 
38 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-7. 
39 Id. at 7. 
40 Id. at 6. 
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compromise must be applied here.”41  It also rejected any notion that the state secrets privilege is 
to be assessed as it would within the context of a criminal case, since unlike a criminal case, “the 
Government is not the moving party and but it is a defendant only on terms to which it as 
consented.”42 
As to methodology, the Reynolds court first confirmed that as a matter of procedure the 
state secrets privilege must be asserted by the government, not a private party, acting through the 
head of the department having control over the subject matter, after personal consideration.43 
The Court also endorsed the view that the more substantial and plausible the government’s 
contentions concerning the danger to national security, the more judicial deference should be 
extended to the government’s assessments concerning the necessary scope of the claim.44  
However, the Court underscored the judiciary’s institutional role and that “[j]udicial control over 
the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.”45  For these 
reasons, the trial court must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of 
privilege without forcing a disclosure of the information at issue.46  In making that assessment, a 
trial court may not “automatically require a disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege 
will be accepted in any case.”47  Rather, the appropriate degree of inquiry will vary according to 
the needs of a litigant. “In each case, the showing of necessity [i.e., the importance of the 
documents or information to the plaintiff’s case] which is made will determine how far the court 
should probe and satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate.”48  
41 Id. at 9. 
42 Id. at 12. 
43 Id. at 7-8. 
44 Id. at 9. 
45 Id. at 9-10 (likening the state secrets privilege and the Fifth Amendment privilege in terms of the balance struck 
concerning the judge’s role in assessing the privilege).   
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 10. 
48 Id. 
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Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be “lightly 
accepted.”49  But the national security interest trumps any private interest once the state secrets 
privilege is recognized.  “Even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of 
privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.”50  In the end, the 
Court laid down the fundamental, albeit amorphous, principle that should govern all judicial 
involvement: the district court must be “satisfied from all the circumstances of the case that there 
is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the 
interests of national security should not be divulged.”51  If the district court is satisfied that there 
is such a danger, it “should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by 
insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.”52  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded on the facts presented that an in camera 
examination of the investigative report was not necessary to determine that the privilege had 
been properly invoked.53  It also concluded that the Air Force’s offer to furnish for deposition 
several surviving members of the crashed airplane’s crew was an acceptable “alternative” to 
disclosure of the investigation report, that the offer “should have been accepted” and that the 
offer made the plaintiffs’ need for the documents more “dubious” and presumably less 
necessary.54  The Supreme Court did not dismiss the case, however, but remanded the case to the 
district court for further consideration and proceedings.55  Justices Black, Frankfurter, and 
Jackson dissented “substantially for the reasons” stated in the Third Circuit’s opinion.56  
49 Id. at 11. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. (“[T]here was certainly a sufficient showing of privilege to cut off further demand for the document on the 
showing of necessity for its compulsion that had been made”). 
54 Id. 
55 The case was settled within months of its remand.  
56 Id. 
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B. The state secrets privilege since Reynolds. 
Since Reynolds, the Supreme Court has issued numerous pronouncements concerning the 
state secrets privilege, as well as the principles underlying the privilege.  For example, in 
Department of the Navy v. Egan, the Supreme Court recognized that “[p]redictive judgments” 
about the possible “compromise [of] some sensitive information” involve the determination of 
“what constitutes acceptable margin of error in assessing the potential risk” and thus “must be 
made by those with necessary experience in protecting classified information.”57  In United 
States v. Nixon, the Court observed that courts should afford the “utmost deference” to executive 
assertions of the privilege for military diplomatic secrets, and judicial review of such a claim of 
privilege is necessarily narrow.58  In C.I.A. v. Sims, the Court, recognizing “the harsh realities of 
the day,” concluded that Congress intended through legislation that the CIA have “sweeping 
powers to protect its ‘intelligence sources and methods’” and indeed, “all sources of intelligence 
that provide, or are engaged to provide, information the agency needs to perform its statutory 
duties with respect to foreign intelligence.”59  It explained that intelligence gathering agencies 
are “familiar with ‘the whole picture,’ as judges are not” and “are worthy of great deference.”  It 
viewed judges as “ill-suited to make the complex political, historical, and psychological 
judgments” about whether disclosures pose an unacceptable risk to an individual or more 
generally, the nation and observed that “[e]ven a small chance that some court will order 
disclosure of a source’s identity could well impair intelligence gathering and cause sources to 
‘close up like a clam.’”60  Moreover, “it is conceivable that the mere explanation of why 
information must be withheld can convey valuable information to a foreign intelligence agency . 
57 484 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1958). 
58 418 US 683, 710 (1974). 
59 471 U.S. 159, 169-70, 174 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). 
60 Id. at 176.  
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. . and it is the responsibility of [the executive branch], not that of the judiciary, to weigh the 
variety of complex and subtle factors in determining whether [to disclose sensitive 
information].”61 
In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, the Court 
announced Totten’s “more sweeping holding”62 that subject matter other than secret espionage 
contracts could be “beyond judicial scrutiny” where “[d]ue to national security reasons” the 
United States could “‘neither admit nor deny’ the fact that was central to the suit.”63  In Tenet v. 
Doe, the Court stated explicitly that the Totten subject matter privilege was not simply a 
“contract rule,” which had been “reduced to an example of the state secrets privilege” discussed 
in Reynolds.64  Nor did “the balancing of the state secrets evidentiary principle” discussed in 
Reynolds replace “the categorical Totten bar.”65  Rather, the Totten privilege’s “unique and 
categorical nature” is intended to preclude judicial review in order to provide the “absolute 
protection” not afforded through the Reynolds privilege and “the frequent use of in camera 
proceedings.”66  For these reasons, a case subject to the Totten bar should be “dismissed on the 
pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence, since it was so obvious that the action 
should never prevail over the privilege.”67  Indeed, it would be “inconsistent” with the nature of 
the Totten privilege to “first allow discovery or other proceedings” before dismissal.68  The 
Court observed in that regard that “[f]orcing the Government to litigate these claims would . . . 
make it vulnerable to “graymail . . . and requiring the Government to invoke the privilege on a 
61 Id. at 180. 
62 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (describing its ruling in Weinberger). 
63 454 U.S. 139, 146 (1981). 
64 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1. 
65 Id. at 9-10. 
66 Id. at 11; see also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (summarizing Tenet v. Doe). 
67 Id. at 9 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
68 Id. at 7 n.4, 8, 11. 
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case-by-case basis risks the perception that it is either confirming or denying relationships with 
individual plaintiffs.”69   
The Court also made clear in Tenet v. Doe that Totten’s scope is limited by its core 
concern: “preventing the existence of the plaintiff’s relationship with the Government from being 
revealed.”70  For that reason, the Totten bar would not apply where the relationship is 
acknowledged,71 but only where “success depends upon the existence of [a] secret espionage 
relationship with the government.”72  Justices Stevens and Ginsburg allowed that “[t]here may be 
situations in which the national interest would be well served by a rule that permitted similar 
commitments [as in Totten] made by less senior officers to be enforced in court, subject to 
procedures designed to protect sensitive information.”73  In General Dynamics Corp. v. United 
States, the Court again stated that the “public policy” of non-justiciability imbedded in Totten is 
not limited to secret espionage cases,74 and even limited, restrictive disclosures of sensitive 
information presents risks to national security.75  Nevertheless, the Court counseled that a court’s 
“intervention” because of the privilege should not unfairly or disproportionately disable or 
empower one party over the over.76   
As discussed below, lower court judges have used these pronouncements to achieve a 
range of results.  But in assessing assertions of the state secrets privilege, judges inevitably face 
three general, overarching issues: (1) the scope and nature of the privilege; (2) the appropriate 
69 Id. at 11(defining “graymail” as “individual lawsuits brought to induce the CIA to settle a case (or prevent its 
filing) out of fear that any effort to litigate the action would reveal classified information that may undermine 
ongoing covert operations.”) 
70 Id. at 10. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 8. 
73 Id. at 11. 
74 563 U.S. 478 (2011). 
75 Id. at 1904 (noting that disclosure of such information to a limited number of cleared lawyers nevertheless led to 
several unauthorized disclosures of military secrets). 
76 Id. at 1907. 
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level of inquiry sufficient to determine the merits of the privilege’s assertion; and (3) the 
consequences on the litigation that result from a valid assertion of the privilege, and when during 
the proceedings those consequences should be definitively imposed.  In determining these issues, 
judges confront what some have characterized as “serious problems” arising out of (1) the 
government’s inability to demonstrate publicly the likelihood of harm without revealing the very 
information sought to be shielded; (2) the inherent dangers associated with the procedures used 
to allow disclosures of any kind for the purposes of assessing the privilege; and (3) the 
judiciary’s limited institutional expertise and competence to assess the probability that a 
particular disclosure will have an adverse effect on national security.77  Appellate judges have 
also had to consider the standard by which to review trial court judgments concerning the state 
secrets privilege, with some open issues on that issue.78 
1.  The nature and scope of the Privilege 
The Totten and Reynolds privileges are distinct privileges, serving different functions.79  
The Totten privilege is generally viewed as a doctrine of non-justiciability, finding its reflection 
in the separation of powers and the need to provide “absolute protection” to certain subject 
matter.80  The Reynolds privilege is an evidentiary privilege applicable to specific information. 
Nevertheless, judges have not always precisely distinguished between the two privileges when 
77 See Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 58 n.31 (and cases cited therein). 
78 See Sterling, 416 F.3d at 342 (adopting de novo review for “legal determinations involving state secrets” including 
a decision to grant dismissal of the complaint on state secrets grounds); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 
(4th Cir. 2007) (same); Jeppensen DataPlan, 614 F. 3d 1070 (reviewing ex parte, in camera documents for the first 
time on appeal); Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 991 (abuse of discretion standard applied to a district court’s determination 
that sworn declarations are sufficient to establish reasonable danger that disclosure would cause injury); Doe v. 
C.I.A., 567 F.3d 95, 100-01(2d Cir. 2009) (finding it unnecessary to determine whether abuse of discretion or de 
novo standard applies to the procedures used to consider the invocation of the state secrets privilege).   
79 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. at 2. 
80 Id. at 11.   
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the core subject matter of the litigation is infused with state secrets.81  Judges also appear to 
accept, at least in principle and at least as to the Reynolds privilege, that the state secrets 
privilege, like other privileges, does not define the parties’ “substantive rights.”82   
Though never precisely clear as to its constitutional provenance, judges see the state 
secrets privilege performing “a function of constitutional significance”83 and have extended to it 
both a status and a consequence far beyond other privileges.84  Through the enactment of 
statutory exemptions from otherwise mandatory or permissible disclosures, Congress has 
effectively recognized the privilege for certain types of national security information that to a 
large extent coincides with the scope of these judicially created privileges.85  Judges also accept 
81 See Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing both Reynolds and Totten as 
authority for its dismissal of the case because “[t]he very subject matter of this action is . . . a state secret”); See also 
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); cf. Jeppensen DataPlan, 614 F.3d 1070 (rejecting the 
“conflation” of the Reynolds and the Totten privilege in El-Masri). 
82 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The federal rules are premised on a distinction between 
substantive claims and the evidence used to prove the claims.  Although evidentiary matters are governed by the 
rules, they cannot modify litigants’ substantive rights as to either constitutional or statutory matters.  Thus, so long 
as the state secrets privilege operates as a rule of evidence, and not as a means to modify [plaintiff’s] substantive 
constitutional rights, we hold that it may be invoked by the United States in a Bivens action”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
83 El Masri, 479 F.3d at 303. 
84 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6 (the states secrets privilege’s “constitutional overtones” were “unnecessary to pass 
upon, there being a narrower [statutory] ground for decision.”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (unlike 
other, qualified executive privileges, the state secrets privilege concerns “areas of Art[icle] II duties [in which] the 
courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities” and to the extent that it “relates 
to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is constitutionally based.”); Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 7 (the state 
secrets privilege “head[s] the list” of evidentiary privileges); El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (“while the state 
secrets privilege is commonly referred to as a ‘evidentiary’ in nature, it is in fact a privilege of the highest dignity 
and significance[]” and is “ . . . derived from the President’s constitutional authority over the conduct of this 
country’s diplomatic and military affairs and therefore belongs exclusively to the Executive Branch.”), aff’d 479 
F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The state secrets privilege . . . has a firm foundation in the Constitution, in addition 
to its basis in the common law of evidence”); Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390, 396 n.10 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“The governmental privileges other than that for state secrets are qualified rather than absolute.  
They may be overcome by a litigant’s showing of necessity . . . [that] outweigh[s] the governmental interest favoring 
secrecy”) (internal citations omitted). But see Gen. Dynamics Corp., 563 U.S. at 5 (observing that the state secrets 
privilege’s “[w[ell-established pedigree” is in the law of evidence) (citing Reynolds). 
85 See The Freedom of Information Act, Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (enabling an agency to refrain from 
disclosing information that is “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept 
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and . . . [is] in fact properly classified pursuant to such 
Executive order.”); The Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (providing for information in patent 
applications to be kept secret when secrecy is deemed to be in the national interest and prevents the inventor from 
securing his patent until the secrecy order is lifted, subject to an inventor’s right to compensation for the United 
States’ use of a device that could not be patented as a result of the Act); The National Security Act of 1947, 
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that the state secrets privilege is not limited to statutory claims, such as the FTCA claim 
considered in Reynolds, but extends as well to constitutional tort claims, as in a Bivens action.86  
In assessing the nature and scope of the privilege, judges acknowledge, as the Reynolds 
Court explicitly noted, that the “compromise” reflected in the states secrets privilege impacts the 
constitutional values imbedded in a transparent, adversarial process.87  From that perspective, 
some judges see the privilege potentially operating to undermine the public’s perception of the 
judiciary’s legitimacy and independence.88  Nevertheless, judges generally reject Due Process 
clause and First Amendment challenges based on claims that a civil litigant has the same due 
currently codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 3021 et seq., (mandating that the director of National Intelligence “shall protect 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure”); and the Central intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 
also codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 3021 et seq.  See also Executive Order on National Security Information, No. 12356, 
47 FR 14874, issued on April 2, 1982, becoming effective on August 1, 1982 (pertaining to FOIA Exemption 1); 
Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958) (a court is authorized to conduct in camera trial proceedings 
under the Invention Secrecy Act). 
86 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 143-44 (“The distinction . . . between constitutional claims and those 
based on statutory grounds means that Reynolds’ holding on statutory grounds does not control.  Nonetheless, it 
hardly follows that the privilege evaporates in the presence of an alleged constitutional violation . . . Although the 
rules of evidence must yield when they offend the constitutional trial rights of litigants, [plaintiff] identifies no trial 
rights that is being abridged.  In [plaintiff]’s view, it is the constitutional nature of his underlying claim that entitles 
him to escape the binds of the federal rules.  We can find no support for this position, which would essentially allow 
any constitutional claim to repress any rule that withholds evidence for reasons other than relevance . . . . ”) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted).  
87 See e.g., Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1968) (“Disclosures in camera are inconsistent with the 
normal rights of a plaintiff of inquiry and cross-examination”); Doe v. C.I.A., 576 F. 3d 95, 107 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“[t]he [district] court, pursuant to Reynolds, dispensed with two fundamental protections for litigants, courts, and 
the public.  First, the district court and the parties lost the benefit of an adversarial process, which may have 
informed and sharpened the judicial inquiry in which would have assured each litigant a fair chance to explain, 
complain, and otherwise be heard . . . Second, they lost the value of open proceedings and judgments based on 
public evidence”). 
88 See, e.g., Doe v. C.I.A., 576 F. 3d 95, 107 (2d Cir. 2009) citing United States v. Aref, 533 F. 3d 72 at 107-08. (2d 
Cir. 2008) (“transparency is pivotal to public perception of the judiciary’s legitimacy and independence.  The 
political branches of government claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason.  Any step that withdraws an 
element of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat and requires 
rigorous justification . . . This is especially so when a judicial decision accedes to requests of the co-ordinate branch, 
lest ignorance of the basis for the decision will cause the public to doubt that complete independence of the courts of 
justice [which] is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution); Richmond Newspapers Inc. v.  Va., 448 U.S 555 
(1980) (“‘without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small 
account . . . Whatever other institutions might present themselves in the character of checks, would be found to 
operate rather as cloaks and checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.’” (quoting 1 J. Bentham, 
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1927)).  
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process rights as a criminal defendant to present all available evidence89 or that the state secrets 
privilege violates a plaintiff’s constitutional right of access to the courts, counsel, or information 
needed to respond to an assertion of the privilege.90  In short, regardless of how a judge views  
competing constitutional values, in the end, national security considerations takes precedence 
over any other consideration.91  
Judges have also taken a narrow view as far as what public disclosures are sufficient to 
remove the veil of secrecy over certain information.92  Likewise, judges have shown little 
89 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (observing that 
equating the rights of civil and criminal defendants “essentially conflate[s] rules governing criminal and civil 
proceedings, elevating the civil contract dispute into the constitutional territory of a criminal prosecution” and citing 
Reynolds’ pronouncement that “such rationale has no application in a civil forum where the government is not the 
moving party, but is a defendant only on terms to which it has consented.”  345 U.S. at 12). 
90  See Doe. v. C.I.A., 576 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting that plaintiff had a “right to submit classified 
material to the Court in connection with the Government’s claim of the state secrets privilege” and a decision on the 
state secrets privilege was “ripe” despite the absence of counter submissions by the plaintiffs). 
91 See Heine, 399 F.2d at 791 (“[I]f the two interests [in camera disclosure and a litigant’s rights] cannot be 
reconciled, the interest of the individual litigant must give way to the government’s privilege against disclosure of 
its secrets of state.”); Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1992) (“the results are harsh 
in either direction and the state secret [sic] doctrine finds the greater public good—ultimately the less harsh 
remedy—to be dismissal”); El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 313 (observing that dismissal in a state secrets cases occurs 
because plaintiff’s personal interest in pursuing his civil claim is subordinated to the collective interest in national 
security); see also Restis v. Am. Coalition Against Nuclear Iran, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5032, 2015 WL 1344479 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2015) (where, for all its stated concerns over the adversarial process, the Court concluded that 
the ex parte, in camera proceedings occurred for “good and sufficient reason: to ensure that legitimate state secrets 
were not lost in the process . . .” and that the plaintiffs’ rights of access to the courts were not compromised by the 
district court’s refusal to require that the CIA facilitate their use of information covered by an assertion of the state 
secrets privilege); El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 539-41 (“while dismissal of the complaint deprives El-Masri of an 
American judicial forum for vindicating his claims, well-established and controlling legal principles require that in 
the present circumstances, El-Masri’s private interests must give way to the national interest in preserving state 
secrets [and] . . . [i]n times of war, our country, chiefly through the Executive Branch, must often take exceptional 
steps to thwart the enemy.  Of course, reasonable and patriotic Americans are still free to disagree about the 
propriety and efficacy of those exceptional steps.  But what this decision holds is that these steps are not proper grist 
for the judicial mill where, as here, state secrets are at the center of the suit and the privileges validly invoked”); 
Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510, 518-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (national security interests take precedence but 
premature to deny plaintiff access to the courts at the pleadings stage in light of the limited state secrets issue 
presented). 
 92 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppensen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (en banc) (concluding that information 
concerning plaintiff’s torture claims were covered by the state secrets privilege even though plaintiff contended that 
“virtually every aspect of [plaintiff’s] rendition, including his torture . . . had been publicly acknowledged by the 
Swedish government” where the plaintiff sought asylum); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 301-02, 308-09 
(4th Cir. 2007) (state secrets were unaffected by public disclosures concerning the existence of the extraordinary 
rendition program, the existence of facilities for that purpose, the “modus operandi” developed for the purposes of 
renditions,  the “decision-making process” pertaining to that program and the role played by other governments); 
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 990 (in determining whether a factual statement is “secret” for the 
purposes of the state secrets privilege, “the court should look only at publicly reported information that possesses 
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disposition to find exemptions, preemptions or waivers with respect to the privilege93 because of 
public or inadvertent disclosures,94 inter or intra-branch or agency disclosures,95 inconsistent 
government positions,96 general official acknowledgements of privileged subject  
matter, 97 illegal, unconstitutional or criminal wrongdoing;98 or federal legislation.99   However, 
some judges have found preemption and waiver implicit in certain federal legislative schemes.100 
substantial indicia of reliability and whose verification or substantiation possesses the potential to endanger national 
security. That entails assessing the value of the information to an individual or group bent on threatening the security 
of the country, as well as the secrecy of the information.”).   
93 See generally Maxwell, 143 F.R.D. at 597 (waiver for the purposes of the state secrets privilege must at least meet 
the requirements for waiver under the Freedom of Information Act, including that (1) the information requested 
must be as specific as the information previously released; (2) the information requested must match information 
previously disclosed; and (3) the information requested must already have been made public through an official and 
documented disclosure). 
94 See, e.g., Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 2008) (inadvertent 
disclosure to the plaintiffs did not make state secrets public information); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 
1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 2009) (“It is one thing for a reporter or authors to speculate or guess that a thing may be so or 
even, quoting undisclosed sources, to say that it is so; it is quite another thing for one in a position to know of it 
officially to say that it is so.”); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972) (“Rumor and 
speculation are not the equivalent of prior disclosure.”). 
95 See, e.g., Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 9 (“[T]he government is not estopped from concluding in one case that disclosure 
is permissible while in another case it is not.”); Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 994 (no waiver through books by former CIA 
officials screened and approved by the CIA); N.S.N. Int’l Ind. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 140 F.R.D. 275, 280 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (no waiver where counsel for private company given prior access to privileged documents). But see 
Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 492-93 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (declining to recognize the privilege where claimed 
privileged information had been revealed to the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence). 
96 See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 990, 996 (N.D. Ca. 2006) (concluding that “the 
government has opened the door for judicial inquiry by publicly confirming and denying material information about 
its monitoring of [claimed privileged] communication content”). 
97 See, e.g., El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 537-38 (“Plaintiff’s argument that government officials’ public affirmation 
of [privileged subject matter] undercuts the claim of privilege misses the critical distinction between a general 
admission that [the subject matter] exists, and the admission or denial of the specific facts at issue in this case.  A 
general admission provides no details as to the means and methods employed in these renditions, or the persons, 
companies or governments involved.”).  
98 See Founding Church of Scientology v. N.S.A., 610 F.2d 824, 829 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (distinguishing under 
FOIA information whose disclosure “simply . . . might uncloak an illegal operation” and information whose 
disclosure “would reveal” state secrets”); Silets v. Dep’t of Justice, 945 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) 
(privilege would be effectively eliminated under FOIA if allegations of criminal conduct were sufficient to 
overcome the privilege); El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 312 (rejecting theory that judiciary is obligated to “jettison” the state 
secrets privilege in order to exercise “a roving writ to ferret out and strike down executive excess”); Frost v. Perry, 
919 F. Supp. 1459, 1466 (D. Nev. 1996) (allegations of criminal violations of Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act insufficient to overcome privilege); Maxwell 143 F.R.D. at 598, aff’d Maxwell v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., No. 
92-2392, 1993 WL 264547 (4th Cir. 1993) (privilege assertable to protect state secrets even if it also allows 
concealment of alleged illegal conduct). 
99 See Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434, 438-40 (D. Nev. 1995) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act does not 
preempt or supersede the states secrets privilege since it does not “speak directly” to whether the privilege applies to 
the required statutory disclosures) aff’d sub nom Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, (9th Cir. 1998); see also Hepting 
v. AT&T, No. C-06-672, 2006 WL 1581965, *3 (N.D. Ca. 2006) (premature to grant access to privileged 
information under statutory authorization). 
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(a)  The Totten privilege 
Supreme Court pronouncements notwithstanding, there has been a range of judicial views 
concerning the nature, scope, and application of the Totten subject matter privilege. There 
appears to be general agreement, however, that the privilege, where it in fact applies, constitutes 
or closely approximates a rule of non-justiciability that issues out the Constitution’s separation of 
powers. 101 
As to its scope, some judges have resisted applying the Totten privilege to fact situations 
beyond those closely approximating the facts of that case - a secret contract of espionage.102 
Some judges have applied the  Totten privilege broadly based on the principle that it applies  
where a party’s “success depends on the existence of a secret espionage relationship with the 
government.”103  For example, judges often dismiss employment discrimination claims against 
the CIA based on the Totten privilege where necessary but protected evidence, such as the 
identity of covert operatives or assignments, would need to be disclosed.104  Other judges have 
essentially expanded Totten’s categorical bar to any subject matter “so pervaded by state secrets 
as to be incapable of judicial resolution once the privilege has been invoked.”105 On the other 
100 Hepting v, AT & T, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 984 (state secrets privilege pre-empted under FISA); Halpern v. United 
States, 258 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1958) (Invention Secrecy Act “must be viewed as waiving the [state secrets] privilege”).  
101 See Fn 181 infra; Part I.B.3.iii infra at 50. 
102 See In re Sealed Case, 494 F. 3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 
1093 (9th Cir. 2010) (Hawkins, J. dissenting) (the Totten privilege does not apply to claims based on an illegal 
“rendition” program). 
103 See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540 (2006) (alterations omitted) (citing Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 
(2005)) (finding it dispositive that the plaintiff himself was not a party to any secret espionage agreements or 
relationships). 
104 See, e.g., Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 341 (4th Cir. 2005); Abilt v. C.I.A., No. 1:14-cv-1031, 2015 WL 
566712 (E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2015).  But see Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10 (2006) (“But there is an obvious difference, 
for purposes of Totten, between a suit brought by an acknowledged (though covert) employee of the CIA and one 
filed by an alleged former spy.  Only in the latter scenario is Totten’s core concern implicated: preventing the 
existence of the plaintiff's relationship with the Government from being revealed.”). 
105 See, e.g., El-Masri, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007); see also id. at 308 (extending Totten’s categorical bar to 
any case where privileged information “will be so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to 
proceed will threaten disclosure of privileged matters”); Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1197 (The Totten bar “has 
evolved into the principle that where the very subject matter of a lawsuit is a matter of state secret, the action must 
be dismissed without reaching the question of evidence.”); Fitzgerald v Penthouse, 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985) 
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hand, some judges have resisted relying on the Totten privilege, even where it could clearly 
apply, in favor of a more particularized consideration of the claimed privileged information 
under the more flexible Reynolds privilege,106 although an application of the Reynolds privilege 
within this context essentially conflates the Totten and Reynolds privileges.107 
(b)  The Reynolds privilege 
While the Reynolds privilege, as all evidentiary privileges, is to be “narrowly 
construed,”108  judges have nevertheless applied it expansively to not only the kind of “military 
secrets” considered in Reynolds, but also to any information whose disclosure would endanger 
“national security,” broadly defined based on Reynolds,109 including clandestine intelligence 
operations and sensitive aspects of foreign affairs.110  Some judges have equated the scope of 
(Totten subject matter exclusion applies beyond direct contractual privity cases where “sensitive military secrets will 
be so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten disclosure of the 
privileged matters”); Jeppesen DataPlan, 614 F.3d at 1093 (Bea, J., concurring) (the Totten privilege applies to 
claims based on an illegal “rendition” program); Restis v. Am. Coalition Against Nuclear Iran, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 
5032, 2015 WL 1344479 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2015). 
106 See Jeppesen DataPlan, 614 F.3d at 1084 (relying on the Reynolds privilege because of the “extremely harsh 
consequences” of the arguably applicable Totten privilege and “because conducting a more detailed analysis will 
tend to improve the accuracy, transparency and legitimacy of the proceedings.”); Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1201 
(disapproving of El-Masri’s conflating the Totten  subject matter bar and the Reynolds privilege with respect to 
subject matter that prevents the use of non-privileged information); see also Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United 
States, 244 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (refusing to dismiss under Totten a claim based on an alleged secret 
agreement between the CIA and a foreign insurance company concerning the funding of a clandestine CIA 
operation); Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 n.2 (noting that CIPA-like procedures could be used to facilitate 
litigation even though the subject matter was privileged under Totten). 
107 See, e.g., Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1087 n.12; Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547-48 
(2d Cir. 1991) (dismissal required under Reynolds and Totten because “the very subject matter . . . is privileged”); 
Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1989) (“the state secrets privilege alone can 
be the basis for dismissal of an entire case”); Fitzgerald v Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d. 1236, 1241-42 (4th Cir. 
1985). 
108 Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 480 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
109 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10 (protected state secrets include “matters which, in the interest of national security, 
should not be divulged”), cited in Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 8, (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jabara, 75 F.R.D. at 483 n.25; 
Frost v. Perry, 919 F. Supp 1459, 1464 (D. Nev. 1996). 
110 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (state secrets extend to “covert operatives, 
organizational structure and functions . . . intelligence-gathering sources, methods, and capabilities . . . locations of 
facilities . . . [and] the organization of classified employees”); Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(missile defense systems); Farnesworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (military 
contracts and military employees’ job responsibilities); Fitzgibbon v. C.I.A., 911 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(extending the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Sims to intelligence methods); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1,7 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (Halkin I) (NSA intercepted communications of Vietnam protesters); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 
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“state secrets” to that of "national defense,” as used in The Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217, 
and The Defense Secrets Act of 1911, 36 Stat. 1040,111 described by the Supreme Court as “a 
generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the 
related activities of national preparedness.”112   
Judges have also effectively expanded the scope of the state secrets privilege, and the 
deference to be extended to the Executive Branch, through the use of the so-called “mosaic 
theory,” under which seemingly innocuous or unimportant pieces of information become 
protected because they are part of an overall “mosaic” from which “sophisticated analysts” could 
derive privileged information.113  Judges have refused, however, to equate all classified 
information with information protected under the state secrets privilege.114  Conversely, judges 
appear willing under appropriate circumstances to extend the privilege to information that is not 
977, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Halkin II) (instances of foreign assistance in surveillance and identity of CIA operatives); 
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“impairment of the nation’s defense capabilities, 
disclosure of intelligence-gathering methods or capabilities, and disruption of diplomatic relations with foreign 
governments”); Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1992) (the operation and defects of 
classified weapons systems); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d at 1242 (4th Cir. 1985) (experiments with 
potential weapons systems); El-Masri, 479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th Cir. 2007) (“foreign affairs”); Heine v. Raus, 305 F. 
Supp. 816 (D. Md. 1969) (CIA instructions concerning the identity of a presumed Soviet agent); Pack v. Beyer, 157 
F.R.D. 226, 231-32 (D.N.J. 1994) (“the public interest” and the placement of prisoner plaintiffs in a “Maximum 
Control Unit”); Republic of China v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551, 553 (D. Md. 1956) (conversations 
between British and American officials concerning sovereign immunity of China); Black v. United States, 900 F. 
Supp. 1129, 1134 (D. Minn. 1994) (the identities of government agents, the nature and purpose of their contacts with 
individuals under investigation and the location of contacts); Frost v. Perry, 919 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Nev. 1996) 
(environmental information at a classified military facility).  But see Jabara, 75 F.R.D. at 492 (holding that the state 
secrets privilege does not extend to “arrangements” through which the FBI requested and obtained information from 
a federal agency or the “general” manner in which the FBI used such information).  
111 See Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jabara, 75 F.R.D. at 483 n.25; Frost, 919 F. Supp. 1459, 
at 1464. 
112 Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941). 
113 See Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 8-9; Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 58 n.31; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305; Black, 62 F.3d at 1119 
n.5; In re United States, 872 F.2d at 475; Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166; Herring v. U.S, 424 F.3d 384, 391 n.3 (deference 
is required because of “the near impossibility of determining with any level of certainty what seemingly 
insignificant pieces of information would have been of keen interest to a Soviet spy 50 years ago”); Knight v. C.I.A., 
872 F.2d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 1989) (“even the most apparently innocuous [information] can yield valuable 
intelligence”); C.I.A. v Simms, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (“bits and pieces of data may aid in piecing together bits of 
other information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself”) (internal citations omitted); 
see also David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 
628 (2005). 
114 Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1070. 
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classified.115  Judges also recognize that the privilege also does not technically extend to 
information pertaining to “domestic security.”116  But the boundaries between domestic and 
foreign intelligence sources and methods often blur; and the protections afforded under the state 
secrets privilege are often considered together with more qualified law enforcement privileges 
applicable to domestic security, often without precise differentiation.117  
2.   The level of inquiry into the basis for the Privilege  
 
When confronted with an assertion of the state secrets privilege, judges often first 
consider whether it may be side-stepped altogether, either because the information at issue is 
immaterial or inadmissible under the rules of evidence118 or because the case may be dismissed 
on such grounds as non-justiciability, the political question doctrine, governmental immunity or 
standing.119 
Should an assessment of the privilege be necessary, a judge will usually first assess 
whether the government has satisfied the Reynolds requirement that an appropriate person has 
asserted the privilege after personally concluding that an invocation of the privilege is 
115 See Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 996 n.69; Frost, 161 F.R.D. at 438-40; Maxwell, 143 F.R.D. at 596 n.6, aff’d No. 92-
2392, 1993 WL 264547 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Mohamed v Holder, 1:11-cv-50, Doc. No. 104-1(E.D. Va.) 
(government claimed state secrets privilege as to the unclassified Watchlist Guidance pertaining to the No Fly List).  
116 See, e.g., Jabara, 75 F.R.D. at 493-94; Kinoy, 67 F.R.D. at 14.   
117 See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d. at 405 n.11; Yang v. Reno, 157 F.R.D. at 632; 
Jabara, 75 F.R.D. at 480; United States v. Felt, 491 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1979) (dealing with the liaison 
relationships between the United States and foreign countries as they pertain to the foreign activities of a domestic 
terrorist organization). 
118 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014) (any possibly privileged 
documents were inadmissible under the rules of evidence); Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 520 (E.D. Va. 
2014) (any privileged documents immaterial to procedural due process challenges to No Fly List). 
119 See, e.g., Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1 (finding inadmissible any possibly privileged documents); Wilson v. Libby, 
498 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding no cognizable Bivens remedy); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C 2010) (finding no jurisdiction based on lack of standing and the political question doctrine); Al-Aulaqi v. 
Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding no jurisdiction based on lack of standing, non-justiciability, 
political question, and the lack of cognizable Bivens or other remedy); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C Cir. 
2012) (finding no Bivens remedy in a case involving the military, national security, or intelligence); United States v. 
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (finding no Bivens remedy for damages arising out of military service). 
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appropriate.120  Some judges see this procedural requirement bound up with the political 
accountability that justifies an appropriate degree of judicial deference to Executive Branch 
judgments.  For that reason, they have applied rigorously the Reynolds requirement that “the 
decision to object [to disclosure] should be taken by the minister who is the political head of the 
department, and that he should have seen and considered the contents of the documents and 
himself have formed the view that on grounds of public interest they ought not to be produced” 
(emphasis added).121    
Nevertheless, as a general proposition, judges have not aggressively challenged whether 
the appropriate senior officer of the responsible agency has “personally” reviewed and 
considered the assertion of the privilege.122  Judges do expect, at a minimum, an explicit 
representation that an appropriate declarant has done so 123and also a reasonable degree of 
specificity with respect to the identity of the materials and information reviewed and the reasons 
120 One unresolved issue is whether a foreign government can assert the privilege in a civil context, a topic beyond 
the scope of this paper.  See Compagnie Française d’Assurance Pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 25-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting assertion of the state secrets privilege by a French-owned 
plaintiff company as outside the privilege’s scope); In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated August 9, 2000, 218 F. Supp. 
2d 544, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (assuming without deciding the privilege is available on behalf of a foreign country but 
not as to communications between employees of a private corporation and the foreign government); Gilmore, 8 F. 
Supp. 3d at 7-8 (recognizing assertion of state secrets privilege on behalf of the Palestinian Authority).  It would 
appear that the state secrets privilege is not properly asserted by a state or state agency.  See Chisler v. Johnston, 796 
F. Supp. 2d. 632, 639 (W.D. Pa. 2011), citing El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 304 (“[T]he state secrets privilege must be 
asserted by the United States”). 
121 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8 n.20 (1953); see also Yang v. Reno, 157 F.R.D. at 633 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding 
based on Reynolds that the Executive Secretary of the National Security Agency was not an appropriate person to 
invoke the state secrets privilege). 
122 See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that “the government’s public statement 
need be no more (and no less) specific than is practicable under the circumstances”); Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 
323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 76 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding that the affidavits of the Attorney General and others were sufficient 
even though they did not state that the Attorney General actually reviewed the documents at issue); Northrop Corp, 
751 F. 2d at 400 (finding that review by the Secretary of Defense was sufficient because “he had reviewed a 
representative sample of the documents as well as affidavits of staff members who had received all the documents”); 
Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that personal examination is not required when the 
object of discovery in the lawsuit was to establish a state secret). 
123 See. McDonnell Douglas, 751 F.2d at 405; Yang v. Reno, 157 F.R.D. at 634 (finding insufficient declarant’s 
statement that he is “familiar with the types of issues and information that could arise” with respect to claimed 
privileged information or that he “understands” that the information had been the subject of high level Executive 
Branch discussions concerning policy matters). 
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for withholding those materials.124  Judges  have  occasionally rejected the privilege for a lack of 
specificity in this regard,125 although judges often provide ample opportunities to cure any such 
deficiencies.126   Judges also appear to recognize the organizational reality that a filed declaration 
reflects to a certain necessary extent a collective agency effort and judgment and that “in 
actuality the personal consideration requirement is often thwarted.”127  For essentially the same 
reasons, judges have allowed subordinate officials to supplement agency head declarations with 
information that explains in further detail the reasons for the invocation of the privilege.128   
Judges also evaluate compliance with the “personal consideration” requirement based on 
the nature of the litigation.  For example, when the central focus of the litigation involves 
privileged “subject matter,” some judges view the “personal consideration” requirement to 
extend only to the “subject matter,” not each piece of protected information within that subject 
matter.129  On the other hand, where the privilege involves only specific pieces of information 
relevant to litigation, judges appear to expect a more individualized document assessment and 
have sometimes required explicitly that the responsible agency official personally review and 
124 See Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 971-72 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 
F.R.D. 390, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
125 See Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D 1, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
126 See Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 827, n.1 (2d Cir. 1979); Hyundai Merchant Marine v. United States, 
1991 WL 190563 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 388, 393-94 (C.D. Cal. 
2002). 
127 Nat’l Lawyers Guild, 96 F.R.D. at 396 n.11. 
128 See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d  at 1169(use of subordinate official to explain “how a claim of privilege plays 
out in practice is consistent with Reynolds’[] insistence that the decision to object be made at the highest level . . . 
[T]he Secretary, once she has properly invoked the claim of privilege and adequately identified categories of 
privileged information, cannot reasonably be expected personally to explain why each item of information arguably 
responsive to the discovery request affects the national interest.”) (internal citations omitted); In re United States, 
872 F.2d at 474 (approving use of classified declaration of assistant director of FBI’s Intelligence Division); 
Molerio, 749 F.2d at 821 (suggesting that Agency head’s designee could determine whether state secrets were 
implicated in discovery requests). 
129 See, e.g., Molerio, 749 F.2d at 821 (personal examination not required when the object of discovery in the lawsuit 
was to establish a state secret); Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d at 1142 (agency head only needs to 
personally review the “type of evidence” necessary to support claim that privileged information is requested). 
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vouch for each document at issue. 130  Judges also appear to agree, however, that in determining 
whether to assert a state secrets privilege, the responsible government official has no obligation 
to “balance” or weigh the competing interests.131   In any event, judges have made clear the high 
degree of candor expected in connection with government representations, with substantial 
consequences likely for any attempts to obstruct, mislead or misdirect the court.132  But even in 
these cases, judges evidence a strong commitment to protecting potentially privileged 
information, despite government misconduct.133 
Once a judge determines that the privilege has been properly asserted by the appropriate 
official, a judge must then, in every instance, consider whether the level of inquiry will extend 
beyond the un-redacted ex parte, in camera declarations filed as a matter of course by high 
ranking agency officials and the Attorney General.  Judges have unquestioningly assumed their 
inherent authority to require the ex parte submission of the underlying documents, as well as 
other information not typically considered in assessing other privileges, or to conduct ex parte 
evidentiary and other hearings.134  Judges have evidenced, however, widely divergent 
dispositions concerning whether to go beyond the government’s initial submissions.   
130 See, e.g., Nat’l Lawyers Guild, 96 F.R.D. at 403 (concluding that a sampling technique was not sufficient and that 
the Attorney General must review personally each item for which he asserts the state secrets privilege); but see 
Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 992-93(finding CIA Director’s affidavit “necessarily unspecific” and not too vague when read 
against the backdrop of widespread public disclosures).  
131 See Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 994 n.65; Nat’l Lawyers Guild, 96 F.R.D. at 400. 
132 See, e.g., Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2009). 
133 Id. (giving the government “yet another opportunity to convince the Court that its redactions were proper and that 
they have been limited to only privileged information”); see also Al-Aulaqi v Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 81 (granting 
the government’s motion to dismiss despite the United States’ “truculent opposition” that made the case 
“unnecessarily difficult” and required the court “to cobble together enough judicially-noticeable facts from various 
records”); Islamic Shura Council of S. Cal. v. F.B.I., 779 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1125-26 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (protecting 
documents and information pertaining to national security even after government conceded it had filed false 
declarations concerning the number of such documents that existed). 
134 See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d at 305 (“in some situations, a court may conduct an in camera 
examination of the actual information sought to be protected, in order to ascertain that the criteria set forth in 
Reynolds are fulfilled”); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d at 58 (“[w]hen assessing claims of a state secrets privilege, a 
trial judge properly may rely on affidavits and other secondary sources more often that he might when evaluating 
assertions of other evidentiary privileges”); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d at 1169 (“[e]laborating the basis for the 
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Appellate judges, relying principally on Reynolds, have emphasized that a judge may 
conclude from the declarations alone that the privilege clearly applies; and a trial court should 
not review documents in camera  unless a judge cannot determine from the submitted 
declarations that the “dangers asserted by the government are substantial and real.”135  For that 
reason, and relying on Reynolds’ cautionary directives, judges most often conclude that no 
further inquiry is required when the subject matter disclosed in the complaint falls squarely 
within certain broad protected categories, such as covert military or intelligence operations,136 
the identity of covert operatives or relationships,137 advanced weapons systems,138 or secrecy 
agreements.139  However, even when it appears that the privilege applies to some information, 
judges have nonetheless examined the underlying documents where the breadth of the privilege 
is not clear from the nature of subject matter, as described in the government’s declarations.140  
In fact, some judges consider in camera inspection mandatory before a case is dismissed.141   
claim of privilege through in camera submissions is unexceptionable”); but see Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) (in deciding 
preliminary questions, “the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege”). 
135 See, e.g., Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 343-45 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Once the judge is satisfied that there is a 
‘reasonable danger’ of state secrets being exposed . . . any further disclosure is the sort of ‘fishing expedition’ the 
court has declined to countenance.  Courts are not required to play with fire . . . .”) (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10); 
El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305 (citing cases). 
136 See, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296; Abilt 
v. C.I.A., No. 1:14-cv-01031, 2015 WL 566712 (E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2015). 
137 Maxwell v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 143 F.R.D. 590 (D. Md. 1992); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 339. 
138 See, e.g., Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d at 547 (“As a reviewing court we conclude that it is 
self-evident that disclosure of secret data and tactics concerning the weapons systems of the most technically 
advanced and heavily relied upon of our nation’s warships may reasonably be viewed as inimical to national 
security.  The privilege was thus properly invoked.”); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (defamation 
claim based on accusations of espionage and secret weapons program involving dolphins); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. 
v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980) (contract interference dispute involving former defense contractor and the 
United States Navy). 
139 Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005). 
140 Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 58-59. 
141 Id. at 59 n.37 (“[w]hen a litigant must lose if the claim is upheld and the government’s assertions are dubious in 
view of the nature of the information requested and the circumstances surrounding the case, careful in camera 
examination of the material is not only appropriate . . . but obligatory”) (internal citations omitted); Hepting v. 
AT&T Corp., 2006 WL 1581965 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“Because the government contends that the primary reason for 
rejecting Plaintiffs’ arguments are set forth in the Government’s in camera, ex parte materials . . . the court would 
be remiss not to consider those classified documents in determining whether this action is barred by the privilege”) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Mohamed v. Jeppensen DataPlan, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (judges 
sitting en banc reviewed in camera, ex parte the documents at issue, even though the district court had not); but see 
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In determining whether to review the underlying documents in camera, judges appear to 
consider first and foremost, consistent with Reynolds, the plaintiff’s need for the information in 
question, with a greater need justifying a deeper inquiry.142  But other considerations are also 
typically involved, including  (1) the amount of deference appropriate to the privilege claim, 
considered in light of its plausibility,143 the detail, consistency and accuracy of the government’s 
representations ,144 the age of the information at issue,145 and the nature of the government 
conduct relative to its recognized powers;146 (2) whether in camera inspection is necessary to 
El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d. 530 (ED Va. 2006), aff’d sub nom 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (district court 
dismissed and Fourth Circuit affirmed without ex parte review of the documents). 
142 See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 (“[t]here is nothing to suggest that the electronic equipment, in this case, had 
any causal connection with the accident.  Therefore, it should be possible for respondents to adduce the essential 
facts as to causation without resort to material touching upon military secrets . . . [plaintiffs] were given a reasonable 
opportunity to do just that, when [the government] formally offered to make the surviving crew members available 
for examination.  We think that offer should have been accepted”); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d at 59 n.37, 38; In 
re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 144; see also Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (noting the relevance of 
information that was available publicly). 
143 Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 59 (“the more plausible and substantial the government’s allegations of danger to national 
security, in the context of all the circumstances surrounding the case, the more deferential should be the judge’s 
inquiry into the foundations and scope of the claim”); Knight v. United States C.I.A., 872 F.2d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 
1989) (absent evidence of bad faith, it is “beyond the purview of courts” to challenge a determination by the director 
of central intelligence that a classified document could reveal intelligence sources and methods); El-Masri v. Tenet, 
437 F. Supp. 2d at 536-37 (“the judiciary must accept the executive branch’s assertion of the privilege whenever its 
independent inquiry discloses a “reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters 
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”) (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10) (emphasis in 
original). 
144 See, e.g., Horn v. Huddle, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 17; Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 58 n.3  (noting that the court 
(a) “did not give a high degree of deference to the government because the government has already committed fraud 
on this Court and the Court of Appeals regarding what information is covered by the state secrets privilege in this 
case,” (b) “the fraud . . . diminished the government’s credibility and led the Court to believe that perhaps the 
government had misrepresented other facts in the litigation” particularly since “the Court’s consideration of the 
plausibility of the government’s claims given all of the circumstances of the case is a proper consideration to take 
into account when evaluating the privilege” and (c) “the government asserted the privilege too broadly, as this Court 
simply could not reconcile some of the information that the government claimed was privileged with a reasonable 
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose state secrets matters that should not be divulged”) (internal 
citations and alterations omitted); see also Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d at 1003 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting the government’s argument that “state secrets form the subject matter of a lawsuit, and therefore require 
dismissal, any time a complaint contains allegations, the truth or falsity of which has been classified as secret by a 
government official”).  
145 United States v. Ahmad, 499 F.2d 851, 855 (4th Cir. 1974) (“any considerations of national security interests . . . 
must be viewed in the light of circumstances as they exist at the time the request for disclosure is made–not when 
the affidavit was prepared or the material filed with the court”); compare United States v. Koreh, 144 F.R.D. 218, 
222 (D. N.J. 1992) (the identity of sources 50 years ago remains protected because “[c]ommon sense indicates that 
an intelligence organization which compromises its source of information is unlikely to recruit new sources”). 
146 See, e.g.,  Mohamed v Holder, 1:11-cv- 50 (E.D. Va. Sept. 15, 2014) [Doc. No. 139] ( referencing a “particularly 
strong heightened institutional responsibility” to look beyond filed affidavits where the challenged government 
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separate, if possible, protected information from protected information;147 and (3) the risks of 
inadvertent disclosure through court review, including the parties’ demonstrated ability to act 
appropriately to protect sensitive information.148  Some judges also appear  more disposed to 
proceed beyond the filed declarations when the privilege arises within the context of significant 
constitutional claims, rather than statutory claims,149 or where there are plausible claims that the 
privilege is asserted to conceal government misconduct.150  One group of appellate judges 
summarized the inquiry for this purpose as a “sliding scale” that at one end involves a litigant’s 
losing without the information at issue, coupled with a “dubious” government claim of privilege, 
and at the other end, a “trivial” showing of need by a litigant coupled with a “significant risk of 
serious harm if information is disclosed.”151  Those same judges also concluded that before 
conducting an ex parte, in camera review, the government should be required to either “publicly 
explain in detail the kinds of injury to national security it seeks to avoid and the reason those 
conduct “involves the extraordinary exercise of executive branch authority . . . that results in the deprivation of basic 
liberties according to secret executive branch decision making, without pre-deprivation judicial review, based on 
criteria that require, at a minimum, nothing more than a suspicion of future dangerousness, without the opportunity 
for an affected citizen to learn of, and respond to, the information relied upon for the government’s decision, either 
before or after the deprivation”). 
147 In re United States, Misc. No. 375, 1993 WL 262658, at *9 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“. . . although it is true that the court 
has the power to disentangle sensitive information from non-sensitive information, in this case the contractors have 
not even alleged the government’s assertion of the privilege is too broad or that it covers any nonsensitive 
information.  Rather, in this case all of the information over which the government has asserted the privilege is 
plainly sensitive”).  
148 See McDonnell Douglas, 751 F.2d at 399. 
149 See, e.g., Stillman v. Dep’t of Def., 209 F. Supp. 2d 185, 223 n.4, 231 (D.D.C 2002) (noting that “this Court will 
not allow the government to cloak its violations of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights in a blanket of national 
security” in rejecting the government’s position that “the national security interest asserted here always trumps a 
plaintiff’s constitutional claim.  The balance of a statutory interest, under for example the Freedom of Information 
Act, against the compelling interest in controlling access to sensitive information, is a very different question than 
the balance between equally compelling constitutional interests”) (citing United States v. Wa. Post Co., 403 U.S. 
713, 729 (1971)) for the proposition that “when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system 
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-
protection or self-promotion”), rev’d 319 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
150 Mohamed v. Jeppensen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1085 n.8 (finding it necessary to review the privilege with a 
“skeptical[] eye” particularly in the face of allegations of government wrongdoing that would motivate use of the 
privilege by government officials to “to protect themselves or their associates from scrutiny”). 
151 Id. at 401 (citing Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d at 59). 
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harms would result from revelation of the requested information or . . . indicate why such an 
explanation would itself endanger national security.” 152  
Whatever the level of inquiry, the judge must determine under Reynolds whether “from 
all the circumstances” there is a “reasonable danger” that disclosure of the information at issue 
will endanger national security.  Judges have not identified or embraced any objective criteria by 
which to assess the sufficiency of the government’s showing in that regard, beyond those broad 
subject matter categories discussed above.  Likewise, in assessing an assertion of the privilege, 
judges have not typically attempted to distinguish between the risks of disclosure associated with 
the process of adjudicating a claim and the risks that harm would actually be inflicted if 
information were disclosed.  Rather, judges appear to extend a very high level of deference to the 
Executive Branch’s overall judgments concerning whether and how information, if disclosed 
would affect national security.153 
In any event, judges appear to accept that they do not need complete knowledge of how a 
disclosure of information would “endanger” national security154 or whether harm will in fact 
result from disclosure of the information at issue.155   Rather, in one candid formulation, “[t]he 
crucial aspect of [the various] formulations[s] of the test [determining whether the requisite 
degree of certainty that harm is threatened] is the [court’s] willingness to credit relatively 
152 Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 63-64 (“[B]efore conducting an in camera examination of the requested materials, the trial 
judge should be sure that the government has justified its claim in as much detail as is feasible (and would be 
helpful) without undermining the privilege itself”). 
153 See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d at 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e acknowledge the 
need to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot legitimately find 
ourselves second guessing the Executive in this arena.”); Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 9 (“The standard of review here is a 
narrow one.  Courts should accord the ‘utmost deference’ to executive assertions of privilege upon grounds of 
military or diplomatic secrets”). 
154 See, e.g., Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 990 (“Therefore, the critical feature of the inquiry in evaluating the claim of 
privilege is not a balancing of ultimate interests at stake in the litigation . . . [but] the determination is whether the 
showing of the harm that might reasonably be seen to flow from disclosure is adequate in a given case to trigger the 
absolute right to withhold the information sought in that case”); see also In re Sealed Cases, 494 F. 3d at 144 (citing 
Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 991; Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 10). 
155 See, e.g., Northrop Corp., 751 F. 2d at 402 (“It is not necessary for the government to show that harm will 
inevitably result from disclosure, nor . . . is it an essential element that the disclosure be public”). 
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speculative projections of adverse consequences,” with the “utmost deference” extended to 
evaluating these “speculative projections.”156   Some appellate judges have framed the inquiry as 
whether disclosure presents “a reasonable danger of divulging too much to a ‘sophisticated 
intelligence analyst;’”157 others, in terms of whether disclosure would disrupt diplomatic 
relations158 or whether “disclosing the information in court proceedings would harm national 
security interests.”159  One judge has concluded that the “[the court] must simply assume 
ultimate danger once the claim of privilege is upheld” in order to avoid an “unwitting 
compromise of the privilege in the course of attempting to skirt its edges . . . .”160   
In assessing these factors, judges do not find themselves limited by the rules of evidence, 
procedures developed under FOIA, or restrictions on the use of affidavits pertaining to summary 
judgment.161  One group of appellate judges would not “discourage” the use of unspecified 
“procedural innovation[;]”162  and at least one judge has considered the appointment of an expert 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706 “to assist the court in determining whether disclosing 
particular evidence would create a ‘reasonable danger’ of harming national security.”163  Judges 
appear to accept, however, that a plaintiff is not entitled to participate in the in camera 
examination of putatively privileged materials, through cleared counsel or otherwise, and a 
district court should not permit any such participation, even if the plaintiffs or their counsel knew 
156 McDonnell Douglas, 751 F.2d at 402 (alterations in original and citations omitted) (quoting Ellsberg, 709 F. 2d 
at 58 n.35; Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 9). 
157 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 144 (citing Halkin I at 10).  As summarized by the D.C. Circuit in Halkin II, a 
judge, in determining the propriety of the privilege should remember that “[t]he critical feature of the inquiry in 
evaluating the claim of privilege is not a balancing of ultimate interests at stake in the litigation . . . [but] the 
determination . . . whether the showing of the harm that might reasonably be seen to flow from disclosure is 
adequate in a given case to trigger the absolute right to withhold the information sought in that case.”  690 F. 2d at 
990. 
158 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. The Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Republic of China v. Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1956). 
159 Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004).  
160 Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F. 2d 268, 279 (4th Cir. 1980). 
161 See Ellsberg, 709 F.2d  at 64; Frost, 919 F.Supp. at 1466-67. 
162  Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 64.      
163 Hepting v. AT&T, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
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or previously had access to some of the information subject to the government’s claim of 
privilege.164 
3.  The consequences on the litigation of a valid state secrets privilege. 
The privilege, once recognized, is “absolute,”165 and may not be overcome by any 
showing of need.166  Likewise, a court may not compromise the protections afforded by the 
privilege through less than complete non-disclosure to a litigant.167  Judges recognize in this 
regard, and in varying degrees of candor, that the state secrets privilege represents a judgment 
that the civil litigant’s personal claim is “subordinated to the collective interest in national 
security.”168  Accordingly, faced with a valid invocation of the privilege, a judge must then 
consider whether the litigation may proceed without the fact finder’s use of the privileged 
information.  
There has been vigorous debate over the years concerning precisely how to make that 
determination.  Some judges adhere to the view that the privileged information is simply 
unavailable for any purpose, “as though a witness had died, and the case will proceed 
164 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 311 (The use of cleared counsel is “expressly foreclosed by Reynolds”); Ellsberg, 709 F. 
2d at 60-61 (stating that it is “well-settled” that  a trial judge should not permit plaintiff’s counsel to participate in an 
in camera inspection because “our nation’s national security is too important to be entrusted to the good faith and 
circumspection of a litigant's lawyer (whose sense of obligation to his client is likely to strain his fidelity to his 
pledge of secrecy) or to the coercive power of the protective order”); Doe v. C.I.A., 576 F.3d at 106; Sterling v. 
Tenet, 416 F.3d at 348; Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 7(“However helpful to the court the informed advocacy of the 
plaintiffs’ counsel may be, we must be especially careful not to order any dissemination of information asserted to 
be privileged state secrets.”); Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. at 486-87 (“the superiority of well-informed advocacy 
becomes less justifiable in view of the substantial risk of unauthorized disclosure of privileged information”); Tilden 
v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (finding cleared counsel not entitled to access); but see Doe, 576 F.3d at 106 n.8 
(“There may be cases in which a district judge would act within his or her permissible discretion by permitting the 
plaintiff’s counsel to take a greater role in the court’s state-secrets deliberations where, in the circumstances, doing 
so would not endanger the secrets”) and at 108 (reserving on “whether and to what extent the government could 
validly refuse to grant the plaintiffs the access they sought to discuss, view, or record classified information not 
properly covered by an assertion of the state-secrets privilege”). 
165McDonnell Douglas, 751 F. 2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
166 Id.  
167 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 311-12 (concluding that protective procedures were “expressly foreclosed by Reynolds”). 
168 Sterling, 416 F.3d 338, 348 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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accordingly, with no consequences save those resulting from the loss of the evidence.”169  Under 
this view, a case will proceed unless the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case without the 
privileged information, even if the privilege excludes other information central to plaintiff’s case 
or a valid defense.170  Central to this thinking is that the parties should be treated 
“evenhandedly,” that neither party be “preferred” or given an advantage because of the 
unavailability of privileged information,171 and that it should not matter which party “has won 
the race to the courthouse.”172  For these judges, no evidence would be considered for any 
purpose that is not “introduced in a fashion in which the plaintiff has access to it,”173 with any 
other approach “potentially frightening.”174  Nevertheless, these judges would consider such 
“techniques” as the waiver of a jury and in camera dispositions by the court, along with the use 
of cleared counsel and other courtroom personnel, in order to “minimize the tensions necessarily 
produced . . . between the accepted doctrine that every litigant is entitled to his day in court and 
the assertion of the secrecy privilege essential to the common welfare.”175   
Other judges have categorically rejected this approach. They see in the state secrets 
privilege issues that are “sui generis in the administration of justice.”176  They find in the nature 
169 See, e.g., Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d at 270-71, vacated en banc, 635 F.2d 281 (quoting C. 
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 109 (2d ed. 1972)). 
170 Id. at 271-72.  
171 Id. at 273 (“Hence, in order that the parties may be treated evenhandedly it is crucial that neither party be 
preferred, that neither be given an advantage because of inaccessibility of evidence on privilege grounds”). 
172 Id. at 272 (“[T]he technicality of who is plaintiff and who is defendant should not matter . . . resolution should 
not relate to who has won the race to the courthouse.”); see also Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
1900, 1907-08 (2011) (citing principles that requires the Court to withhold any relief so that the “the parties will be 
left where they are”). 
173 Id. at 275 n.16 (citing Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). 
174 Farnsworth Cannon, 635 F.2d at 282-83 (en banc) (Murnaghan, J. dissenting) (objecting to the approach 
endorsed by the majority wherein “[a]ny litigant . . . whose proof is hampered by the invocation of state secrets can 
hereafter be turned away from his efforts to obtain justice on the questionable grounds that, for reasons as to which 
he must remain uninformed, he might stumble intrusively into a protected area”). 
175 Id. at 275-76. 
176 Id. at 276 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A claim by the national sovereign of state 
secret evidentiary privilege in litigation between private parties creates a problem that seems to me to be sui generis 
in the administration of justice.”); see also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139. 
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of the privilege itself something that necessarily compromises the intrinsic fairness of the 
adversary process and creates a fundamental unfairness in using that litigation process after it has 
been disabled in its truth finding function because of the privilege.177  For these judges, how to 
proceed must be informed by a wide range of considerations including the parties’ ability to 
present their claims or defenses and the dangers of inadvertently disclosing privileged 
information in the process of litigating claims while observing the privilege.178  
Over the years, and with some still unresolved issues, discussed below, there appears to 
have emerged a general consensus on how judges should assess the consequences of the 
privilege on the litigation.  On the one hand, judges will allow the case to proceed, at least 
initially, where the privileged information does not affect the parties’ practical ability to litigate 
the merits of a claim.179  However, judges generally consider dismissing a case based on a proper 
invocation of the state secrets privilege where (1) the plaintiff is unable to make out a prima 
facie case without privileged information; (2) an “available” or “valid” defense cannot be 
established without privileged information;180 or (3) the privileged “subject matter” of the case 
precludes litigating the merits of a claim without compromising protected information.181  A 
177 See, e.g., Farnsworth Cannon, 635 F.2d at 276-79 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(reviewing why the “difficulties and artificialities” associated with the state secrets privilege “may so far inhibit the 
litigation process as to draw in question its essential utility for resolving a dispute”). 
178 Id. at 279-80. 
179 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 141 (concluding that plaintiff could establish a prima facie Bivens claim 
without privileged information); Mohamed v. Holder, 2015 WL 4394958, at *2 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2015) 
(concluding that any claimed privileged information was not relevant to plaintiff’s procedural due process claims 
concerning the No Fly List).  
180 See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d at 309-10 (“Furthermore, if El-Masri were somehow able to make 
out a prima facie case despite the unavailability of state secrets, the defendants could not properly defend themselves 
without using privileged evidence”); Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d at 777 (affirming summary judgment in 
favor of defendant after concluding that “defendants cannot defend their conduct with respect to [the plaintiff] 
without revealing the privileged information”). 
181 See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 153 (“If the district court determines that the subject matter of a case is so 
sensitive that there is no way it can be litigated without risking national secrets, then the case must be dismissed”); 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen the ‘very subject matter 
of the action’ is a state or military secret, the action must give way to the proper invocation of the state secrets 
privilege”) (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)); Sterling, 416 F.3d at 348 (quoting DTM 
Research, LLC v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 2001)) (concluding that dismissal is the proper remedy 
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judge must also decide at what point in the case it is appropriate to rule definitively on whether a 
case should be dismissed on any of these grounds.182   
a. Dismissal based on a plaintiff’s inability to establish a prima facie case. 
Dismissal based on the plaintiff’s inability to establish a prima facie case is simply an 
application of the general principle, applicable to all evidentiary privileges, that privileged 
information simply becomes unavailable to all parties; and the merits of the parties’ respective 
positions will be determined without the use of the protected information (the “No Use” 
principle).183  The first inquiry is therefore whether the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case 
without the privileged material.  Judges have not required, at least as to constitutional tort claims, 
that a plaintiff, as part of his initial showing, disprove any possible defenses.184   
In assessing whether a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, judges appear to agree 
that a plaintiff cannot benefit from any adverse inferences drawn from the government’s 
invocation of the state secrets privilege.185  But judges have further restricted plaintiffs in their 
ability to establish a prima facie case in primarily two ways.  The first is to restrict access to 
certain non-privileged information.  The second is to restrict the use of non-privileged testimony 
where “the very question on which a case turns is itself a state secret, or the circumstances make clear that sensitive 
military secrets will be so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten 
disclosure of the privileged matters”) (internal quotations omitted). But see El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 306 (“The effect 
of a successful interposition of the state secrets privilege by the United States will vary from case to case.  If a 
proceeding involving state secrets can be fairly litigated without resort to the privileged information, it may 
continue”). 
182 See generally Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (en banc) (where the majority and dissent 
take different positions concerning when the consequences of recognizing the state secrets privilege as to certain 
information should be assessed). 
183 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 144-45 (quoting Ellsberg,, 709 F.2d at 64 & n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1983); C. 
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 109 (2d ed. 1972)). 
184 See, e.g., id. at 145.  
185 See Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  The state secrets 
privilege in this respect is treated differently than other privileges asserted in a civil context.  See, e.g., Baxter v. 
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 439 (McNaughton rev. ed. 
1961)) (internal quotations omitted) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to 
civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment 
does not preclude the inference where privilege is claimed by a party to a Civil cause”). 
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or evidence.  Both restrictions are based on the view that the litigation process itself, either in 
pre-trial or trial proceedings, creates too serious a risk of inadvertent disclosure of protected state 
secrets information. 
  (i) Limitations on access to non-privileged information.  
There appears to be no serious debate over whether the privilege prohibits the discovery 
of protected information.186  Judges have further restricted access to non-privileged information 
based on the privilege, either in discovery or at trial, either because it cannot not be 
“disentangled” from the “mosaic” of privileged information without an unacceptable risk of 
compromising privileged information187 or because the non-privileged information is deemed 
insufficiently reliable to outweigh whatever risks from inadvertent disclosure may exist with 
respect to privileged information.188   In many cases, these restrictions lead to an outright 
dismissal and, in effect, constitute an extension of the Totten subject matter bar.  On the other 
hand, where the subject matter itself is not privileged, some judges are animated by an obligation 
to disentangle non-privileged from privileged information whenever possible.189  For example, 
some have allowed discovery of non-privileged information closely related to privileged subject 
186 See, e.g., In re United States, 872 F.2d at 474. 
187 See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 57) (“Although ‘whenever possible, 
sensitive information must be disentangled from nonsensitive information to allow for the release of the latter,’ 
courts recognize the inherent limitations in trying to separate classified and unclassified information.”); Halkin I, 
598 F.2d at 8 (“[T]he business of foreign intelligence in this age of computer technology is more akin to the 
construction of a mosaic . . . [where] [t]housands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can be 
analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate.”); Bareford v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d at1143 (“Fitzgerald and Farnsworth Cannon recognize the practical reality that in the 
course of litigation, classified and unclassified information cannot always be separated”). 
188 See, e.g., Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d at 548 (“Appellant has not designated any sources of 
reliable evidence on the factual issues going to liability.  Any evidence procured through discovery would of 
necessity be of no greater reliability than dockside rumor, if that, and clearly insufficient to establish a prima facie 
case in an area involving highly sophisticated technology and secret military tactics.”). 
189 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 153 (citing In re United States, 872 F.2d at 476) (recognizing the 
obligation of district courts to “disentangle sensitive information from non-sensitive information”); Horn v. Huddle, 
647 F. Supp. 2d at 61 (“Regardless of whether the Court accepts or rejects the government’s assertion of the 
privilege over certain information . . . the Court still must fashion a way for this case to ultimately proceed to 
discovery and trial, keeping in mind that the very subject matter of the action is not a state secret.”).  
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matter, particularly from non-government sources, where the discovery relates to essential, but 
less sensitive elements of a claim, whose resolution might obviate the need to consider dismissal 
based on the privilege.190  One judge struck a jury demand in an ordinary contract case and 
referred the case to a magistrate judge for confidential proceedings.191 Some have used CIPA-
type procedures, such as redactions and summaries, to allow for disclosure and use of sensitive 
but non-privileged information.192  In permitting such discovery, judges have referenced the 
“possible unfairness” and “the appearance of impropriety” in dismissing a case without such 
discovery.193  As one group of appellate judges observed, maintaining “that balance [between the 
government’s security needs and a litigant’s right to develop and present their case] . . . required 
the court to give a fair amount of leeway to plaintiffs in building their case from non-government 
sources.”194  Some judges appear to be more inclined to limit the litigation impact of the 
privilege within the context of significant constitutional claims, as opposed to statutory or purely 
190 See, e.g., Monarch, 244 F.3d at 1361(district court refused to dismiss on the basis of Totten privilege and 
provided the plaintiffs with “an opportunity to gather any unprivileged information that may establish a prima facie 
showing that [the purported agent] had the requisite authority to bind the government in contract”). 
191 See Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1977). 
192 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 154 (“[N]othing in this opinion forecloses a  determination by the district 
court that some of the protective measures in CIPA . . . which applies in criminal cases, would be appropriate.”); 
Horn, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (“If the Court determined the case could proceed using CIPA-like procedures, it would 
have to weigh whether the advantage gained from the procedures would outweigh the concomitant intrusion on 
national security.”); see also Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d at 338 (“Such procedures, whatever they might be, still 
entail considerable risk.  Inadvertent disclosure during the course of a trial—or even in camera—is precisely the sort 
of risk that Reynolds attempts to avoid. At best, special accommodations give rise to added opportunity for leaked 
information. At worst, that information would become public, placing covert agents and intelligence sources alike at 
grave personal risk.”); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (finding that special procedures involving cleared 
counsel and application of CIPA have been effectively used in other cases, but that those procedures are ineffective 
“where . . . the entire aim of the suit is to prove the existence of state secrets”). 
193Monarch, 244 F.3d at 1362, 1364 (“The evidentiary decision the trial court made . . . denying direct discovery 
from official government sources but allowing further discovery from other sources—struck an appropriate balance 
between the security needs of the Government and the rights of litigants under establish evidentiary rules and 
procedures to develop and present their case.”). 
194 Id. (“We think that under the circumstances here, when plaintiffs were already severely constrained in their 
discovery effort, the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing [additional] discovery”). 
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economic claims.195  But even judges most disposed to facilitating the litigation of claims in the 
face of subject matter protected by the state secrets privilege have acknowledged strict limits on 
a court’s ability to do so within acceptable boundaries.196 
In fashioning procedures designed to allow a case to proceed, judges have confronted 
particular challenging and unsettled issues concerning whether a court can order that a party or 
his lawyer have access to classified information.197  Central to that inquiry is whether “the 
Executive Branch ha[s] the exclusive right to determine whether counsel, who have been 
favorably adjudicated for access to classified information, have need-to-know classified 
information within the context of litigation or can that be a judicial determination?”198  In 
assessing these issues, judges have considered, inter alia,  the nature and age of the clearances 
previously obtained, the scope of the subject matter to which cleared access had been obtained, 
the nature of  the relevant classified, but non-privileged information and its relationship to 
privileged information, a judge’s ability to make the necessary decisions without the assistance 
195 See, e.g., Stillman v. Dep’t of Def., 209 F. Supp. 2d 185, 223 n.24 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[A]lthough the balance of 
interests between a plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights and the government’s interest in national security is 
relevant in state secrets cases only to the level of scrutiny to be applied by the court, many of the state secrets cases 
cited in support of defendants’ argument are further distinguishable because plaintiffs assert only statutory claims. 
These cases do not support the proposition argued by the government here that the national security interest asserted 
here always trumps the plaintiff’s constitutional claim. The balance of a statutory right, under for example the 
Freedom of Information Act, against the compelling interest in controlling access to sensitive information, is a very 
different question than the balance between equally compelling constitutional interests”).   
196  See Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 59-60 (confronting “what to do when the government has improperly 
asserted the privilege, asserted it too broadly, or when the Court contemplates it must order that the parties or their 
counsel have access to classified information in order to prevent a future breach of national security”).  In rejecting 
the government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege and electing to proceed with discovery, the Court “was 
tempered by a few considerations,” including: (1) the ability to provide clear boundaries in closed “CIPA-like” 
proceedings as to what information is privileged; (2) the ability to limit the scope of these proceedings to 
information already known to the parties with cleared counsel; (3) the possibility of imposing CIPA-type protective 
measures; and (4) the ability to narrow the scope of these proceedings to information the parties intended to use at 
trial and over which it could justify why the information was not privileged.  Id. at 59-60. 
197 See Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (“While there are a plethora of cases concerning the state secrets 
privilege, very few cases even tangentially discuss how a Court is to proceed when the Court has denied the 
assertion of the privilege, but the government still claims that portions of the non-privileged materials are 
‘classified.’”).   
198 Id. 
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of counsel, and the extent to which classified information can be adequately safeguarded during 
discovery and at trial without involving an informed counsel.199 
Judges have divided over these issues.  While judges uniformly recognize that whether 
and how to classify information is a discretionary, non-justiciable matter committed solely to the 
Executive Branch, some think it is “beyond dispute” that a judge is authorized to order 
disclosures of classified information under CIPA-like procedures within the context of civil 
litigation.200  For these judges, “[w]ere the rule otherwise the Executive Branch could 
immediately ensure that the ‘state secrets privilege’ was successfully invoked simply by 
classifying information and the Executive’s actions would be beyond the purview of the judicial 
branch.”201  At least one judge has concluded when confronting these issues that the appropriate 
course is not dismissal or the exclusion of non-privileged information, but additional disclosures 
to cleared parties and/or counsel that would allow them to “. . . precisely map the division 
between what portion of the information [they] know is covered by the privilege and what 
isn’t.”202  Other judges have expressed serious reservations about such judicial innovations.203  
199 See id. 
200 Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (rejecting the government’s position that “the Court does not have the 
power to conduct these CIPA-like proceedings because it would require the plaintiff and defendants to discuss 
classified information with their attorneys, and the Court cannot order the Executive Branch to grant a security 
clearance to a particular individual because that decision is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the 
Executive Branch”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stillman, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 193, 222 
(rejecting the government’s contention that “the United States Constitution has placed the discretion to control 
access to classified information solely in the hands of the Executive Branch” and disputing the “blanket proposition 
that national security interests necessarily outweigh any constitutional interests asserted by a plaintiff in litigation”). 
201 Horn, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 62; see also Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1006 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 
(1953)) (“Reynolds makes clear that ‘classified’ cannot be equated with ‘secret’ within the meaning of the 
doctrine.”); Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 58 (“Thus, to ensure that the state secrets privilege is asserted no more frequently 
and sweepingly than necessary, it is essential that the courts continue critically to examine instances of its 
invocation”). 
202 Horn, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (alternation in original) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 159 (Brown, J., 
dissenting in part)) (“[O]nly by providing clear boundaries to counsel in closed, ‘CIPA-like’ proceedings can 
national security interests be adequately safeguarded.”); Id. at 59 ([W]ithout clear boundaries as to what information 
is privileged and what is not, there would be an unacceptable risk to national security were this case to ultimately 
proceed to discovery and trial”); Id. at 61–62 (quoting Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d at 281 
(“Moreover, if the parties and attorneys are kept completely in the dark as to the extent of the privilege, they will 
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Whatever their disposition, judges have generally been reluctant to order access to any classified 
information, absent special or exceptional circumstances, even where a party or his counsel has 
the necessary clearances or had such access previously.204  In one case, appellate judges barred 
access to the plaintiff’s own complaint.205   
Judges have also generally rejected constitutional challenges to security clearance 
restrictions based on judicial independence,206 due process,207 and First Amendment 
consideration,208 effectively deferring to the Executive Branch’s security clearance judgments, 
primarily on separation of powers grounds.  Judges also have not been particularly receptive to 
‘probe as close to the core secrets as the trial judge would permit’ and ‘[s]uch probing in open court would 
inevitable be revealing”). 
203 See, e.g., Stillman v. C.I.A., 319 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  There, the district court allowed plaintiff to access, 
together with his counsel, the classified information the government claimed was disclosed in plaintiff’s manuscript 
about China’s nuclear weapons program.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the court must first conduct 
an in camera review of the material and determine whether it could resolve the classification issue without the 
assistance of plaintiff’s counsel.  “If not, then the court should consider whether its need for such assistance 
outweighs the concomitant intrusion upon the Government’s interest in national security.”  Id. at 549.  See also In re 
United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (vacating the district court’s order that required the Air Force to grant 
plaintiff’s counsel special access to classified information); Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (when assessing 
the appropriateness of alternative procedures, “the Court was not without hesitation in ordering the participation of 
the plaintiff, his counsel, the defendants, and their counsel in solving difficult questions of privilege and 
classification”).  
204 See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d at 402 n.9 (“[P]rior disclosure of similar 
information does not preclude the potential for harm resulting from the present, requested disclosure”); In re United 
States, 1 F.3d 1251 (Table), 1993 WL 262656, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1993) (quoting Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 9  
(Under the special access rules set forth in executive orders each program is separate, each potential “accessee” is a 
separate issue, and “[t]he government is not estopped from concluding in one case that disclosure is permissible 
while in another case it is not”); Id. (“That the United States’ attorneys may have reviewed the compartmented 
information at issue here is entirely irrelevant to whether there would be a ‘reasonable danger’ to national security if 
the information is released to someone new, including the contractors’ attorneys in connection with this lawsuit.  
Under Reynolds, that is the sole issue that is judicially reviewable”); see also Doe v. C.I.A., 576 F.3d 95, 106 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (quoting Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d at 348 (“Even if they already know some of it, permitting the 
plaintiffs, through counsel, to use the information to oppose the assertion of privilege may present a danger of 
‘[i]nadvertent disclosure’—through a leak, for example, or through a failure or misuse of the secure media that 
plaintiffs’ counsel seeks to use, or even through over-disclosure to the district court in camera—which is precisely 
the ‘sort of risk that Reynolds attempts to avoid.’”); Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014) (concluding 
that it would be inappropriate to order the disclosure of classified information to the plaintiff). 
205 Doe v. C.I.A., 576 F. 3d at 106-107. 
206 Id.  
207 Id. 
208 See, e.g., In re United States, 1993 WL 262658, at *6 (citations omitted) (“Because application of the Military 
and State Secrets Privilege can require complete dismissal of a case, any subsidiary limitation on conferring with 
counsel which might otherwise be precluded by the constitution cannot apply here.”). 
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claims that such discovery is necessary to prevent the privilege’s use to conceal wrongdoing, 
embarrassment or incompetence, and to the extent judges have expressed a willingness to 
consider such possibilities, they have required a plaintiff to make an essentially impossible 
threshold showing.209  But again, in this context, as in others, judges will react adversely to any 
attempts to mislead or stonewall the court; and at least one of the few published decisions to 
order access to classified but not privileged information appears to have been influenced to a 
significant degree by the government’s misrepresentations concerning the basis for its privilege 
claim.210 
(ii)  Limitations based on the inherent nature of the litigation process. 
 
Judges have also restricted a plaintiff’s ability to establish a prima facie case where the 
realities of the litigation process itself present dangers of disclosure deemed too high to accept.  
Judges have acted in this fashion particularly when (a) the government’s formal and public 
response to the plaintiff’s allegations would essentially constitute disclosure of state secrets 
information, if only by negative inference,211 or (b) witnesses cannot be safely examined without 
209 See McDonnell Douglas, 323 F.3d at 1023 (“[A]lthough the Contractors ascribe a fraudulent and deceptive intent 
to the government and its agents [in using the state secrets privilege to restrict the ability to proceed on the merits], 
they have not presented any evidence or corroborative facts to support their allegations.  Nor have they cited any 
case in which the government has actually misused the Military and State Secrets privilege as they describe”). 
210 See Horn, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (“The Court does not give the government a high degree of deference because of 
its prior misrepresentations regarding the state secrets privilege in this case”). 
211 See El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (“[A]ny admission or denial of these allegations by defendants in this case 
would reveal the means and methods employed pursuant to this clandestine program and such a revelation would 
present a grave risk of injury to national security.”); Al-Haramain, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (refusing to require the 
government to confirm or deny whether plaintiffs’ communications have been or continue to be intercepted, but 
requiring the government to confirm or deny particular “surveillance events”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 507 
F.3d 1190, 1204-05 (refusing to require the government to respond generally and in all respects on the grounds that 
“[t]he [privileged] document, its contents, and any individuals’ memories of its contents, even well-reasoned 
speculation as to its contents, are completely barred from further disclosure in this litigation by the common law 
state secrets privilege”). 
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risking the disclosure of protected information.212  Some judges have expressed contrary 
views.213 
In determining whether the litigation process can operate without undue risk to national 
security, judges appear to be influenced, as on other state secrets issues, primarily by the core 
subject matter, and the extent to which it is infused with privileged information.  Other 
significant considerations appear to be the parties’ litigation conduct and attitudes, and that of 
their counsel, as reflected in such matters as their candor with the court and a demonstrated 
ability to cooperate in discovery, disentangle classified from non-privileged information, or 
protect classified information already in their possession.214  
b.  Dismissal based on a “valid defense.” 
Judges generally agree that a case must be dismissed if the privileged information 
deprives a defendant of an “available” and “valid” defense.  But judges disagree over how 
central to a defense the excluded privileged information must be to justify dismissal.  In 
answering that “exceedingly difficult question,” judges appear to agree that the appropriate 
inquiry is whether the exclusion of protected information so “distorts” an adjudication that a case 
212 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d at 1243 (case must be dismissed because allowing 
testimony about what was not classified would allow inferences as to what was classified.); El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 
310–11 (case must be dismissed where any inquiry into relevant facts would implicate sensitive protected 
information concerning the details of an extraordinary rendition program for terrorist suspects); Farnsworth 
Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d at 281(contract case must be dismissed because any adjudication would involve 
reference to the organizational structure of classified Navy programs). 
213 See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 153 (“Although witnesses in the trial proceedings . . . will likely have had 
access to some classified materials in the course of their federal employment in addition to the unprivileged 
materials that form the basis of [plaintiff]’s remaining claim, there is no basis on this record for a presumption that a 
witness who has access to classified materials is unable to testify without revealing information that he knows 
cannot lawfully be disclosed in a public forum; see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 (commenting 
favorable on plaintiff’s access to witnesses who possessed state secrets information for the purpose of obtaining 
non-protected information). 
214 See McDonnell, 323 F.3d at 1022 (citations omitted) (“Given the history of security breaches and discovery 
abuses in this litigation, there is a risk that the military and state secret once divulged is unlikely to remain protected 
in this case.  The public good must prevail over individual needs by enforcing the privilege and protecting the 
military secrets at issue here.”); Attorney General v. The Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d at 954 (“The Government . . . 
has been cooperative in the suit thus far, and has an important and legitimate interest in maintaining this lawsuit.”). 
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should not proceed.215  But the standard by which to measure the “distortion effect” has been the 
subject of animated judicial debate.  Some judges take the view that a case should be dismissed 
only when privileged information would dispositively establish a valid defense, essentially a 
summary judgment standard.216  Other judges have adopted the less demanding standard that 
dismissal is appropriate whenever a determination of a case’s merits, on either affirmative claims 
or defenses, cannot be fairly litigated without disclosing or threatening the disclosure of 
privileged information.217  
In adopting a “dispositive evidence” standard for dismissal, judges have referenced the 
unfairness that a lower standard would impose on a plaintiff unable to know or respond to the 
privileged evidence relied upon for that determination.218  These judges appear to resist 
compunding further what they regard as the uneven treatment already imposed on a plaintiff  by 
virtue of the privilege, recognizing that once the “distortion effect” is deemed too great, a 
215 See, e.g., Molerio, 749 F.2d at 825 (concluding, after reviewing an in camera affidavit that substantiated the 
reason for denying plaintiff’s employment, that it would be a “mockery of justice” to allow the case to proceed, 
knowing the applicable law and supporting facts would prevent a reasonable jury from rendering a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff); see also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d  at 151 (finding that dismissing the case would be appropriate 
when after an ex parte, in camera review of the privileged material, “the truthful state of affairs would deny a 
defendant a valid defense that would likely cause a trier of fact to reach an erroneous result”);  Simonini, 372 F.3d at 
777–78; Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166; Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547; Cf. Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1141. 
216 Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 149. 
217 Id. at 157–58 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“By stripping meritorious defenses from 
[defendant] and leaving gaping holes in [plaintiff’s] prima facie case, the invocation of the privilege so distorts this 
case that dismissal is necessary”); see also Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d at 279 (Phillips, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (“It is quite conceivable . . . that in a given case it might rightly be judicially determined 
that the undisclosable scope of privilege lies so completely athwart the scope of proof relevant to resolution of the 
issues presented that litigation constrained by administration of the privilege simply could not afford the essential 
fairness of opportunity to both parties that is a fundamental assumption of the adversary system”). 
218 See Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 149–50, where the D.C. Circuit has summarized this view as follows: 
Were the valid defense exception expanded to mandate dismissal of a complaint for any plausible 
or colorable defense, then virtually every case in which the United States successfully invokes the 
state secrets privilege would need to be dismissed.  This would mean abandoning the practice of 
deciding cases on the basis of evidence—the unprivileged evidence and privileged-but-dispositive 
evidence—in favor of a system of conjecture.  Just as “[i]t would be manifestly unfair to permit a 
presumption of [unconstitutional conduct] to run against” the defendant when the privilege is 
invoked, it would be manifestly unfair to a plaintiff to impose a presumption that the defendant 
has a valid defense that is obscured by the privilege.  There is no support for such a presumption 
among the other evidentiary privileges because a presumption would invariably shift the burdens 
of proof, something the courts may not do under the auspices of privilege.  
(quoting Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
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plaintiff has no ability to prevail on a claim, no matter how dispositive the evidence supporting 
his claim.219  As one judge observed, any lesser standard would adopt an “all-or-nothing” 
approach to state secrets.220  In a similar vein, some judges see a lower standard as simply a 
further “draconian” erosion of the plaintiff’s substantive rights from the outset.221  They also 
point to other recognized means, other than dismissal, to accommodate the parties’ respective 
interests when less than dispositive evidence affects a defense.222 For example, they point to the 
ability of the Executive Branch to protect its interests by separating privileged from unprivileged 
information,223 the use of an immunity defense for its sued employees deprived of a defense 
because of privileged information,224 and the ability to indemnify a sued employee acting within 
the scope of employment.225 
Other judges have reacted sharply against a filtering standard of proof that effectively 
establishes a presumption that a plaintiff, able to make out a prima facie case, prevails over 
available, possibly meritorious, privileged defenses, unless the privileged information essentially 
219 Id. at 150 (“Faced with the opposite situation, where a plaintiff has proof of a defendant’s liability that is 
inaccessible because of privilege, the courts are powerless to afford a remedy”). 
220 Id. at 152 (characterizing the position as “adopting a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ approach to state secrets: 
whenever the plaintiff lacks information about his claim, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to make out a 
prima facie case, but as soon as any information is acquired, it becomes too risky to introduce the evidence at trial, 
also necessitating dismissal”); see also Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 69. 
221 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 145, 151 (“In the context of the state secrets privilege, the court has recognized 
that where, as here, the plaintiff is not in possession of the privileged material, ‘dismissal of the relevant portion of 
the suit would be proper only if the plaintiff[] w[as] manifestly unable to make out a prima facie case without the 
request information.’”) (quoting Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 65) (alteration in original); see also In re United States, 872 
F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Dismissal of a suit, and the consequent denial of a forum without giving the 
plaintiff her day in court . . . is indeed draconian”). 
222 Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 150 (“[O]ur concurring and dissenting colleague seems to liken a meritorious defense to 
one that is merely potential or colorable.  While suggesting that justice requires the court to withdraw from 
proceedings even where such defenses become unavailable, our colleague overlooks how this circuit’s precedent has 
accommodated the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants”) (citations omitted). 
223 Id.   
224 Id.  
225 Id. at 150–51 (also observing that any “non-pecuniary costs” that may not be susceptible to indemnification are 
outweighed by “the potential costs of a federal service that fails to protect the employees’ constitutional rights”). 
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establishes that defense as a matter of law.226 For these judges, the “dispositive evidence” 
standard is too limiting; and dismissal as a consequence of the privilege should not be based 
exclusively on that standard.  From their perspective, allowing a case to proceed in the face of 
anything less than dispositive adverse evidence results in the “elevation of the rhetoric of perfect 
justice over the realities of distortion and disclosure.”227  The issue is not “whether we like or 
approve of the state secrets privilege.  It exists.  The question is how the existence of the 
privilege, properly invoked, reshapes the case.”228  They fundamentally question whether a 
plaintiff has a right to use a disabled litigation process.  For them, the answer lies in accepting 
that “‘by its very nature,’ the state secrets privilege ‘compromises the intrinsic fairness of the 
adversary litigation process which has been provided for formal dispute resolution’ – for both 
plaintiffs and defendants alike.”229  The critical issue therefore becomes “[w]hen application of 
the privilege so ‘compromises the intrinsic fairness’ of a judicial proceeding – whether because it 
has removed too much information from the plaintiff’s case or from the defendant’s defense, or . 
. . both” 230 that the litigation process no longer becomes a legitimate fact finding process.  Under 
that standard, dismissal should be available whenever “removal of facts relevant to the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case or the defendant’s defenses, or both, so distort the case that the litigation no 
longer even approximates reality” or when “further litigation threatened inadvertent 
226 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 155-56, 158 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting) (“By stripping meritorious 
defenses from [defendant] and leaving gaping holes in [plaintiff’s] prima facie case, the invocation of the privilege 
so distorts this case that dismissal is necessary.  By equating a ‘valid’ defense with a ‘dispositive’ defense . . . the 
majority papers over the novelty of the defense standard it is applying”). 
227 Id. at 160 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
228 Id. See also El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 310–11(the focus is on the facts necessary to litigate a plaintiff’s case and not 
merely those necessary to discuss it in general terms since “the controlling inquiry is not whether the general subject 
matter of an action can be described without resort to state secrets.  Rather we must ascertain whether an action can 
be litigated without threatening the disclosure of such state secrets”). 
229 Farnsworth Cannon, 635 F.2d at 277 n.2 (Phillips, J., specially concurring and dissenting), maj. op. rev’d per 
curiam, id. at 281 (en banc), quoted with approval in In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 157 (Brown, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
230 Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d at 279 n.5, quoted with approval in In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 
157 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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disclosure.”231  At that point, “the right solution is not simply to muddle on, but rather ‘to 
withdraw from . . . litigants their normal right of access to the formal dispute resolution forum 
provided by the sovereign.’” 232  Otherwise, the lawsuit becomes “only a parody of the real 
facts” and to allow the case to continue “is not justice, and only invites injustice.”233  For judges 
adhering to this more flexible approach, the correct analysis is “a case-by-case assessment of 
how the privilege has affected the shape of the case being presented to the factfinder, not 
‘dismissal of a complaint for any possible or colorable defense.’”234  The approach is a practical 
one, rather than doctrinal or formalistic235 and appears to align closely with the view that 
dismissal is appropriate whenever “the very subject matter” of the litigation is so infused with 
privileged information that non-privileged information cannot be disentangled from privileged 
information.236 
Judges also display somewhat different dispositions when the government is the plaintiff 
at risk of dismissal. For example, where the government, as a plaintiff, refuses to produce 
privileged information pertaining to a defense, judges appear to be less inclined to dismiss a case 
231 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 160 (Brown, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
232 Farnsworth Cannon, 635 F.2d at 279. 
233 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 157(Brown, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
234 See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 157, 157, n. 4(Brown, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
Farnsworth Cannon, 635 F.2d at 277 n.2 (“[Dismissal is appropriate] where the judge can sense that the actual 
dispute as defined by the issues so far differs from the dispute that could be litigated while honoring the privilege as 
to draw question the fairness of attempting to apply to the restricted dispute the legal principles appropriate to 
resolution of the actual dispute”). 
235 In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 160. 
236 Id. at 158; see also Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1170; Farnsworth Cannon, 635 F. 2d at 28;  Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1183 
(relying on “the practical reality that in the course of litigation, classified and unclassified information cannot always 
be separated”); Black v. United States, 62 F.3d at 1118; Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d at 1242 n.8 
(dismissal is necessary because “the merits of this controversy are inextricably intertwined with privilege matters”); 
White v. Raytheon Co., No. 07-10222, 2008 WL 5273290 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2008) (concluding “there was no 
practical means by which Raytheon could be permitted to mount a fair defense without revealing state secrets”).  
This school of thought appears to rely on the presumption, discussed above, that the testimony of witnesses with 
personal knowledge of classified secrets relevant to the litigation presents too great a risk of inadvertent disclosure 
of privileged information. See Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1242; Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1143-44. 
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than they otherwise would be,237  resisting “the meat-axe approach” in favor of a “balancing of 
interests.”238  Overall, these judges appear to be more disposed than they otherwise would be to 
find workable alternatives to a dismissal.239  In determining how to proceed, they would consider 
the significance of the privileged information with respect to a defense,240 the need for the 
affected defense,241 the sensitivity of the information at issue,242 the subject matter of the case, 
including whether it involved constitutional rights or statutory claims,243 the importance of the 
interests at stake for the government, including whether the relief the government seeks is 
criminal, regulatory or purely civil in nature,244 what the defendant stands to lose in the case and 
“the likelihood of injustice” were the case to proceed.245  These judges also look generally to the 
parties’ respective behavior, cooperation and good or bad faith during the course of the 
lawsuit,246 although some judges have questioned whether the government’s “good faith” could 
ever be a dispositive or even particularly important factor in assessing “the relative weights of 
the parties’ competing interests with a view towards accommodating those interest, if 
possible.”247   
237 See Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1270–74 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. U.S. Currency, 626 
F.2d 11, 14–18 (6th Cir. 1980). 
238 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. The Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d at 955 (“The factual circumstances surrounding the 
litigation must be borne in mind and a balancing the interests of both parties must be undertaken”).  In this civil 
enforcement action under The Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Circuit Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal 
based on the government’s refusal to produce in discovery documents claimed to be protected under the state secrets 
privilege that related to defendant’s selective prosecution defense, observing that even if, on remand, there were a 
colorable showing of selective prosecution, and an adequate showing of need for discovery, “outright dismissal may 
be too extreme a measure to invoke for plaintiff’s inability to comply with defendants discovery requests” and  a 
judge should consider a number of “competing factors.” 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 950–51. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 955 (Bazelon, J., dissenting)   
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In a case that may substantially affect the approach adopted by judges in earlier cases, the 
Supreme Court recently considered “whether the government can maintain its claim against a 
party when it invokes the state secrets privilege to completely deny that party a defense to a 
claim. ”248  It concluded in that regard that in assessing the consequences to be imposed based on 
the privilege “it is claims and defenses together that establish the justification, or lack of 
justification, for judicial relief; and when public policy precludes judicial intervention for one it 
should preclude judicial intervention for the other as well.”249  Under this jurisprudence, where 
because of the state secrets privilege, neither claims nor defenses can be “judicially determined,” 
the parties would be left “where they stood when they knocked on the courthouse door.”250  It is 
unclear whether this more holistic approach would apply in settings other than the specific 
circumstances of that case.251 
c. Dismissal based on the subject matter. 
As discussed above, whether justified under the Totten or the Reynolds privilege, judges 
will dismiss a case when, as a practical matter, the “centrality” of privileged subject matter 
precludes an adjudication of the merits in any respect without threatening the disclosure of 
privileged information, regardless of whether the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case 
through non-privileged evidence.  When such dismissals occur, they typically occur at early 
248 Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 561 U.S. 1057 (2010) (“Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in No. 09–1302 granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. 
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in No. 09–1298 granted 
limited to Question 2 presented by the petition”). 
249 Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct at 1907 (emphasis in original). 
250 Id. at 1907-08. 
251 Id. at 1910 (“Our decision today clarifies the consequences of [the privilege’s] use only where it precludes a valid 
defense in Government-contracting disputes, and only where both sides have enough evidence to survive summary 
judgment but too many of the relevant facts remain obscured by the state-secrets privilege to enable a reliable 
judgment”). 
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stages of a case, and without requiring a substantive response to the plaintiff’s allegations.252 In 
determining whether dismissal is appropriate on this basis, one group of appellate judges would 
focus on “not whether the general subject matter of an action can be described without resort to 
state secrets…[but] whether an action can be litigated without threatening the disclosure of such 
state secrets.”253  For these judges, “the ‘essential facts’ and ‘very subject matter’ of the action 
are those facts that are essential to prosecuting the action or defending against it.”254  In 
assessing whether dismissal is necessary on these grounds, judges have considered the 
information necessary to both plaintiff’s case and the government’s possible defenses,255 as well 
as whether a specific enabling statute contemplates a trial that by its nature concerns security 
information.256  Judges recognize that dismissal based on the subject matter of the case has 
unfair, harsh, case ending consequences on possibly meritorious claims257 and will sometimes 
reference the availability of other, non-judicial remedies available to a plaintiff,258 although other 
judges see such remedies as unrealistic and illusory.259                         
252 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (dismissal of Alien Tort Statute claim arising from 
extraordinary rendition program operated by CIA); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d (same); Sterling v. Tenet, 
416 F.3d 338 (dismissal of racial discrimination claim against C.I.A. based on covert identities and responsibilities); 
Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138 (dismissal of wrongful death claim based on military weapons 
system); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (dismissal of defamation case based on allegations of 
espionage). 
253 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308; see also Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1143–44 (dismissal required because critical fact 
inquiries could not be answered without threatening disclosure of privileged state secrets); Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1170 
(concluding that specific information needed to litigate a plaintiff's claim was privileged and the action needed to be 
dismissed even though the revelation that the Air Force might have unlawfully handled hazardous waste did not 
endanger national security); Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (8th Cir. 1995) (although general subject 
matter could be discussed, adjudication required "the identity of the alleged wrongdoers, the relationship to the 
government, and their contacts with [plaintiff]," all of which was privileged). 
254 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308. 
255 See, e.g., El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 310 (considering not only likely defenses, but any “hypothetical defenses” and 
concluding that “any conceivable response to [plaintiff’s] allegations would disclose privileged information”). 
256  See, e.g., Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1958) (an in camera trial under the Invention 
Secrecy Act is possible if, “in the judgment of the district court, such a trial can be carried out without substantial 
risk that secret information will be publicly divulged”); see also Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 830 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
257 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 145; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
258 See, e.g., Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1091–92; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 54.  
259 See, e.g., Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1101 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
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Part II. Interviews and Observations  
Thirty-one federal judges were interviewed.260 The group consisted of 23 men and 8 
women, 4 circuit court judges and 27 district court judges, with at least one district court judge 
sitting within the geographical boundaries of each of the federal circuits.261  The judges averaged 
approximately 18 years of service as a federal district or circuit court judge, with several having 
prior judicial experience, either as state court judges or as federal magistrate judges.  Four had 
served thirty years or more as a federal district or circuit judge.  Fifteen had served 20 years or 
more.  Twenty seven had served ten years or more and four had served less than 10 years.  The 
women judges averaged nearly 18 years of federal judicial experience and included the judge 
who had served the longest of any judge interviewed and also the judge who had served the 
shortest period of time.  
Nineteen judges had been appointed by Republican presidents and twelve by Democratic 
presidents.  Thirteen judges had military service.  Sixteen had some law enforcement experience 
before becoming a federal judge, typically with a U.S. Attorney’s Office or the Department of 
Justice.  Eight had both military service and law enforcement experience.  Fourteen had actually 
dealt with state secrets issues, although all but one judge had dealt with classified information in 
some context, typically under CIPA in criminal cases. 
The interviews typically lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes, although some ran as 
long as 1½ hours.  Overall, there were approximately twenty hours of interviews.  Although the 
interviews were not rigidly structured but fairly free-wheeling and developed in different 
260 The author thanks each of these judges for their willingness to be interviewed and the generous amounts of time 
they devoted to reflecting on these issues and their candid comments.  In order to ensure the promised 
confidentiality, limited information is provided as to their specific court and all judges are referred to in the 
masculine.   
261 The interviewed judges were selected based primarily on information known to the author concerning their level 
of experience with state secrets and national security experience (viz., because they had a great deal, some or not 
much), geographical location, years of judicial service  and general reputation as a judge.  No attempt was made to 
make this group statistically representative in any way of the federal judiciary as a whole. 
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directions depending on the judge’s experience and focus, the interviews explored (1) a judge’s 
background and general experience in national security matters, including the use of states 
secrets and classified information; (2) the information a judge  would want to know in deciding 
the issues associated with the assertion of a state secrets privilege, including when the judge 
would go beyond obtaining information facially sufficient to support the privilege; (3) how the 
judge viewed the court’s institutional role and competency to independently assess the privilege; 
and (4) at what point and upon what showing  would the judge defer to executive branch 
judgments that no disclosure of any kind should occur, even at the expense of a case’s dismissal, 
including how the judge would assess the risks of disclosure.  Overall, the judges were asked 
how they would deal with Jane’s case.262  The substance of those interviews is reflected in the 
following general observations and conclusions: 
1. There appears to be widespread alignment between how judges actually deal with 
a state secrets claim and the principles and procedures reflected in published 
opinions.  
 
As a general matter, the judges were aware of and subscribed to the principles applicable 
to an assertion of the state secrets privilege discussed in Part 1.  In particular, judges recognized 
the Executive Branch’s primacy in assessing national security issues and the corresponding need 
to defer to properly substantiated Executive Branch judgments. However, as reflected in the 
discussion below, a significant number of interviewed judges have views somewhat at odds with 
generally accepted judicial pronouncements on certain issue. In that regard, some judges are 
generally (1) more inclined to look beyond the declarations, and examine documents ex parte, in 
camera, than the Reynolds principles seem to counsel, even where the declarations have detailed, 
plausible assertions of the state secrets privilege; and (2) more open to the use of CIPA-type 
262 Before the interviews, the judges were provided the hypothetical concerning Jane, an overview of the state 
secrets privilege substantially as presented in the Introduction, and the questions attached as Appendix A.  
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procedures than the case law appears to sanction or endorse in order to allow the use of non-
privileged information closely related to privileged information.   
2. There did not appear to be any significant correlation between a judge’s 
background and his attitudes or disposition concerning the state secrets privilege  
 
There were no apparent correlations with a judge’s overall approach or disposition 
concerning the state secrets privilege and (a) party affiliation of the appointing President; (b) 
gender; (c) geographical location; or (d) military experience. For example, both Democratic and 
Republican appointed judges were among the most and least pre-disposed to look beyond the 
Executive Branch declarations submitted in support of a state secrets privilege.  Likewise, men 
and women were among those more inclined and less inclined to engage in a questioning 
inquiry; and the same can be said with respect to judges with and without military, law 
enforcement, or criminal defense experience, with the qualification that many (but not all) judges 
with substantial law enforcement experience were among those most disposed to a deep, probing 
inquiry into the basis for the privilege.  Geography did not appear to correlate in any particular 
way except to the extent that judges in certain locations tended to have more experience in 
national security matters than others.   
3. Experienced judges, particularly in the national security area, are more disposed 
to a higher level of inquiry than less experienced judges.  
   
Some (but not all) judges with the most experience in dealing with Executive privileges, 
national security issues and classified information were among those inclined to be the least 
deferential and most probing concerning an invocation of the state secrets privilege. A number of 
judges surmised that their dispositions in this regard related to their increased comfort over time 
in dealing with national security related issues and top secret or higher classified information in 
criminal cases. For example, one experienced judge recalls that he was “bowled over” and “his 
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brain wanted to blow up” the first time he looked at highly sensitive national security 
information, with no sense that he could separate out what was truly sensitive from what was less 
so but that he quickly became more able to separate out “the wheat from the chaff.”   
Those in this group also saw aspects of their law enforcement experience before becoming a 
judge influencing their approach to a state secrets claim. For example, one such judge saw his 
willingness to look behind a state secrets assertion reinforced by his pre-judicial experience in 
dealing with federal law enforcement agencies inclined to over classify information and assert 
overly broad law enforcement privileges.  Another judge saw his insistence on obtaining 
corroborating evidence with respect to national security claims related to his prior law 
enforcement experience dealing with information obtained from confidential informants.  
Similarly, several judges with over ten years of judicial experience but with no or limited 
experience in dealing with the state secrets privilege, surmised that their approach today in 
dealing with a state secrets claim would be much less deferential than it would have been earlier 
in their judicial careers because of their experiences more generally in dealing with government 
claims, which one judge described as, on occasion, “overstated” and “hyperbolic.”   
The willingness of more experience judges to probe deeper also appeared to relate to their 
commonly held belief that, with effort, most issues of disclosure can be resolved in a way that 
allows the litigation to proceed and not be dismissed based on the state secrets privilege or 
classified information more generally.  Several talked about how the scope of a privilege claim 
narrows substantially once a judge “pushes back.”  (“Fifty percent of the time the government 
will narrow the claim.”) One judge observed that the government often objects to disclosure not 
so much because of “the what,” that is, the substance of the information, which can often be de-
sensitized without losing substance, but “the how,” that is, how the information was obtained or 
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collected, which implicates sources and methods, which is often irrelevant to the claims in a 
case.  One judge reflected the general sentiment of many judges when he said that in the end, 
“it’s all about what is fair and how you make it a fair process,” and that even if you cannot 
disclose all the information to the parties, “you can learn it and decide whether you can do 
anything about it.” For these reasons, judges find that they can often find “a way forward” in the 
face of classified information, whether or not state secrets, by “working through” the parties’ 
specific needs for particular pieces of information and usually finding ways to have the substance 
of what is needed provided through non-classified stipulations or summaries. As one judge 
explained with substantial experience in this area, “if you get into the nitty-gritty you can usually 
find a way to make information usable.” Judges with the most experience also thought that less 
experienced judges should not be hesitant in “get into the details.”   
At that other end of the spectrum, judges with little or no national security experience 
expressed concern over their ability to assess in any meaningful way facially plausible Executive 
Branch judgments and were therefore initially inclined to accept those claims without further 
inquiry. These judges also were those who were most receptive to having access to court 
appointed experts, specialized courts or other forms of assistance.  
4. A judge’s view concerning the appropriate level of inquiry appeared to correlate 
to, or at least be influenced by, his views concerning agency proclivities for secrecy. 
 
The more probing dispositions seemed generally coupled with certain views about 
agency proclivities.  For example, one judge who would look at the documents in every case, but 
is otherwise inclined to extend a high degree of deference, thought the government engaged in 
“egregious” over classification of information.  Several other judges in this category, particularly 
those with substantial state secrets experience, mentioned, in substance, that intelligence 
agencies do not “like to share,” often assert a scope broader than necessary, and “dig their heels 
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in.” These judges saw these attitudes often causing the initial assertion of privilege claims 
broader than the government can ultimately defend and attributed this conduct, in various 
articulations, to an attempt, for the most part, to avoid “the hard analysis” and the sometimes 
tedious and difficult task of separating protected information from non-protected information 
until a judge reacts adversely. Some judges with a background in law enforcement saw that over 
time, people dealing in intelligence gathering become “jaded,” promptly the need to engage in a 
iterative process to pare down the scope of the privilege to truly sensitive information. For these 
reasons, the “reality” with respect to the state secrets privilege, as one judge framed it, is that 
judges need to “push back” on the initial level of disclosure before getting to the appropriate 
scope for the privilege. Several judges also expressed in various ways concerns about a 
“bureaucratic tendency” to assert the privilege in “too rote a fashion.”   Some judges see the 
“layered structure” of the Executive Branch as an impediment to getting at what is truly state 
secrets information. 
5. Judges broadly divided as to their presumptive level of scrutiny concerning a 
state secrets claim.  
  
Judges divided essentially into four groups when discussing how they would initially 
approach an assertion of the privilege and decide whether to look beyond initial declarations of 
the Executive Branch.  One group professed a pre-disposition to review the underlying 
documents ex parte, in camera, in every case, even in the face of plausible privilege claims 
substantiated by declarations from high level officials.  As one judge put it, he rejects the “trust 
me” approach. Another in this group observed that “you just don’t take the government at its 
word.” One judge rhetorically asked “why wouldn’t you look at the documents?” and “how 
could you justify not looking at the documents and simply say you relied on an affidavit” before 
dismissing a case or imposing outcome determinative restrictions.  
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A second group had a pre-disposition not to review documents unless the judge found 
some specific justification to do so, such as where the declarations were too conclusory or lacked 
detail, the claimed scope seemed excessive or the subject matter on its face did not plausibly 
involve state secrets.   As one judge in this group remarked, he would  use  the “until proven 
otherwise” standard, under which he would assume that the government is acting in good faith 
and that facially plausible, detailed claims of state secrets were appropriate unless there was 
reason to believe otherwise.  The judges in this group essentially viewed Executive Branch 
judgments concerning national security as too bound up with military and diplomatic 
considerations to be “second-guessed” by the judiciary, absent some special showing.  Judges 
less experienced in national security matters were more often in this category; but other, more 
experienced judges were in this group as well.  For example, one judge with substantial national 
security case experience, while recognizing the court’s obligation not to give the government “a 
free pass,” thought that national security and state secrets judgments invariably involve “multi-
layered” considerations that a judge cannot adequately assess and that disclosures can have 
“ripple” effects that are difficult to predict or assess within the confines of a particular case. He 
also thought that judges do not “make foreign policy” or “run wars” and that there were 
“political” dimensions to national security judgments; and to the extent that the Executive 
Branch’s judgments are unwise, as opposed to unsubstantiated or unconstitutional, “that’s why 
we have elections.”  Another judge, with these perspectives, while positing that he does not 
believe in “blind acceptance” of a privilege claim, thought there was an element of “hubris” for a 
judge to attempt a de novo assessment of national security risks.  He also thought that to a 
significant degree, the inquiry takes place in a “black hole” where it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to make any judgments beyond plausibility and facial validity. Another judge with 
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experience in national security issues, speaking to this issue within the context of Jane’s case, 
viewed the privilege as an essential aspect of the Executive Branch’s authority and 
responsibilities for the national defense, which must take precedence over the interests of any 
particular litigant in order to protect the rights and safety of citizens generally. Another very 
experienced judge with substantial experience in dealing with classified information in criminal 
cases, but with no specific experience in state secrets issues in civil cases, viewed his obligation 
as simply to determine whether information is within the scope of what the government has 
determined is classified and privileged, not whether it should be, and whether information 
deemed protected could be used in some unclassified form.  
 A third group had no particularly pre-disposition but rather took a decidedly practical, 
case by case approach to deciding whether to inspect the actual documents over which privilege 
was claimed.  As one judge put it, he would “go with his nose.” One judge candidly observed 
that to some extent he might be influenced by “how much hell” the plaintiff’s lawyer credibly 
raised.  One judge who had never dealt with a state secrets claim (but had dealt with classified 
documents) thought his interaction with the government would involve a “delicate dance” 
between deference and inquiry.   
A fourth group consisted of several judges who straddled dispositional categories in 
certain respects.  One judge disposed to extend a great deal of deference in light of the “harsh 
realities” of modern threats nevertheless thought such deference was appropriate only after 
obtaining “clear assurances” through the preparation of a “traditional record,” with an actual 
review of the underlying documents. Another judge, while beginning with a “presumption of 
good faith” on the part of the government and in the end extending a great deal of deference to 
Executive branch judgments in the face of “credible evidence of risk,” nevertheless would look 
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at the underlying documents in every case, would require something more than “theoretical 
risks” associated with use of information in a litigation,  and place the burden on the government 
to show why a case cannot be proven or defended without privileged information.  
As to Jane’s case, most judges thought that the facial inequity and unfairness of Jane’s 
situation would cause them to engage in a more probing inquiry.  One judge would want “a live 
person to look him in the eye” and tell him why her security clearance was pulled. Nearly every  
judge would want detailed explanations concerning any link between Jane and any threat from 
her brother. Several thought that there should be a way for Jane to be told definitively why her 
clearance was terminated and she was fired. Assuming that the “taint” emanating from her 
brother was speculative and nothing more substantial than a familial relationship with a 
suspected terrorist, most judges were disposed to finding a way to provide some relief to Jane, 
although many commented on the practical difficulties likely to be encountered.  Several judges 
talked about “pushing hard” on the government and the company to find a way to give relief to 
Jane.  Some judges thought that the company should be able to tell Jane why she was fired and 
she should be given some opportunity for another position within the Company unless there is 
some evidence-based reason disclosed to the company that would justify some other treatment. 
One judge talked in terms of “getting everyone in a room” and “banging heads” about a solution. 
Some talked about pushing to have Jane placed into a less sensitive position. Others thought that 
any relief for Jane might need to pursued, if possible, in a lawsuit directly against the 
government for not having a sufficient process to contest her treatment.  Some judges raised 
concerns about “too cozy” a relationship between the Company and the government that might 
allow the privilege to be asserted at the Company’s request in order to shield itself from Jane’s 
legitimate claims; and for that reason would be inclined to require information about the 
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frequency with which the state secrets privilege is asserted at the request of a private actor.  
Many thought it  unclear what remedy, if any, could be given Jane, given the wide discretion that 
the Executive Branch has with respect to granting or withdrawing security clearances. Some 
doubted any relief was available, given what they thought was the government’s unreviewable 
discretion with respect to security clearances and the necessary link between Jane’s job and 
having the necessary clearances.  
Some judges, on the other hand, while recognizing the unfairness that Jane might 
experience, saw very little that that would justify going beyond facially valid reasons for an 
assertion of the privilege.  One judge viewed Jane’s case as “straightforward” in that the only 
issue to be tried was whether she was properly terminated for lack of a security clearance, with 
no state secrets information likely precluding that issue from being tried.  
6.  Certain considerations centrally influence whether a judge would look beyond 
initial disclosures, regardless of their presumptive level of inquiry.  
 
 Judges most often mentioned the following considerations in determining whether to 
look beyond the initial disclosures in support of an assertion of the state secrets privilege: 
a. The subject matter of the claimed privileged information.  The judges tended to view 
subject matter as the most important factor in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny.  In 
that regard, the categories of information that the judges typically identified as presumptively 
qualifying for state secrets protection included the identity of covert operatives, the sources of 
sensitive information, on-going investigations and, as one judge put it, “anything that can get 
someone killed.”  One judge thought that these categories of information were so sensitive that 
there was “too much risk and not enough reward” in requiring anything beyond the declarations 
typically submitted (for one judge, “even coming to the courthouse” would be too dangerous for 
a covert operative).   
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Beyond these categories, many judges thought that it was “common sense” what 
information had too high a risk of danger to national security if disclosed. But judges with 
substantial national security experience thought the judgments became much more difficult when 
the information related to completed historical events, had been publicly disclosed, for whatever 
reason, or whose protection is claimed under the “mosaic” theory, which one judge observed 
forces a judge to confront “the difficult issue of what you take on faith.”   
b. Subject matter of the litigation. In deciding whether to require additional information 
beyond the initial declarations, judges are fundamentally influenced by the nature and facial 
merits of the claims to be litigated and the seriousness of the plaintiff’s injuries. Most judges 
thought constitutional claims would have a higher “weight” over purely economic claims or 
statutory claims, such as FOIA requests, in deciding how far to probe, particularly where a 
litigant is alleging an on-going constitutional deprivation. Some judges also thought it 
appropriate to consider the extent to which relevant evidence would be available from non-
privileged sources and whether a litigant was on notice that any dispute might be affected by an 
inability to rely upon or disclose sensitive or classified information, such as claims arising out of 
sensitive military contracts or employment claims against intelligence gathering agencies such as 
the CIA.   
c. The level of detail contained in the initial disclosures.  Regardless of their overall 
disposition concerning whether to require the actual submission of the documents at issue, 
critical to every judge in deciding how to proceed is the level of detail provided in the ex parte 
declarations; and judges have a fundamental suspicion of conclusory claims of national security, 
even by high level officials or the Attorney General. One judge saw such conclusory claims, 
without any detail, as a “red flag.”   
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d. Whether the privilege is being asserted simply to conceal embarrassment or 
illegality. The judges had different views about whether the privilege should extend to 
information or conduct that evidenced governmental wrongdoing or illegalities.  But nearly all 
judges, even those judges who thought “embarrassing” or even “illegal” conduct would be 
privileged if sufficiently related to protecting national security, would likely subject such claims 
to a heightened scrutiny.  Other judges had the view that at least illegal conduct was 
presumptively not privileged and would engage in a much more probing inquiry than they would 
otherwise likely pursue.  One judge quipped that if he “smells” any attempt to avoid 
embarrassment or illegality he would aggressively require additional information and 
disclosures. Relatedly, judges expressed more willingness to look behind privilege claims with 
respect to historical information having no obvious on-going significance to national security. 
For some judges, such claims raised the prospect that the privilege was being asserted in order to 
conceal embarrassment or wrongdoing rather than to protect current security needs. 
7.  Judges broadly divided over the likely scope and nature of their inquiry, were 
they to go beyond the filed declarations.  
 
There was also a variety of attitudes concerning the nature of the inquiry beyond the 
initial declarations that a judge would pursue. Those with the narrowest approach emphasized 
that to the extent it is necessary to review documents in camera, they would be reviewed only “in 
gross” with  “a blind eye to the validity of the plaintiff’s claim,” since judges are only looking 
for “facial validity for the claim of national security.”  On the other hand, the most probing 
judges thought it imperative that a judge look at the documents “one by one,” with an eye toward 
finding a way for the litigation to proceed. As one judge explained, it is necessary to “get down 
and dirty” and go through each document in order to properly assess the significance of any 
particular document and the risks associated with disclosure.      
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 Beyond an examination of specific documents at issue, some judges, including some 
with the most national security experience, would want access to the people who can explain the 
particular documents and their significance, including the analysts and agents who often tend to 
be the most helpful, although in their experience, an agency’s “natural tendency” is to “protect 
them.” Others would require some substantiation concerning why a public disclosure, were it to 
occur, presented a significant or substantial threat for actual injury to the national security, as 
opposed to simply embarrassment or “theoretical possibilities.”  For example, one judge said he 
would want information about whether the government’s concerns about the dangers associated 
with disclosure are based on any actual experiences with unauthorized disclosures of the type of 
information at issue in a case, through such events as WikiLeaks, the Pentagon Papers, the 
disclosures by Edward Snowden or unauthorized hacking into computers.   Other judges would 
be interested in knowing such things as whether unauthorized disclosures have, in fact, occurred 
when CIPA procedures were used and what effect those disclosure have had.  
As to whether information was sufficiently “secret” such that its disclosure would present 
an unacceptable risk of danger to national security, the judges likewise evidenced a range of 
views concerning what inquiry it would conduct. One judge said he might go so far as to require 
disclosure of how many people actually know or have access to information claimed to endanger 
national security, if disclosed.  In that regard, judges evidenced a range of views concerning the 
effect unauthorized leaks or official acknowledgments would have on whether information 
remained “secret.” Some thought none at all.  Others thought that a judge could not simply 
“ignore realities” once “the cat was out of the bag.”  Other judges thought that there was a 
difference between disclosures affecting military secrets and those pertaining to relationships 
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with other countries, with the privilege pertaining to military secrets likely less affected by 
public disclosures than diplomatic secrets.  
8. Whatever their presumptive level of scrutiny, judges widely shared certain values, 
beliefs and expectations in assessing an assertion of the state secrets privilege. 
 
Despite differences in a judge’s presumptive level of scrutiny, judge broadly shared 
values and expectations of the Executive Branch with respect to an assertion of the state secrets 
privilege.   
a. Judges are most influenced by “separation of powers” principles. Judges most often 
mentioned the “separation of powers” as the overarching principle that governs their approaches 
to and assessments of a state secrets claim. That principle operates, however, as both an 
empowering and a restraining influence.  
On the one hand, the judges said, in substance, that their constitutional obligation is to be, 
in a very real sense, an “independent check” on Executive Branch power. As one judge 
remarked, “there is no one else out there” to play that role. Others talked about how the public is 
relying on the judge to ask “the hard questions,” make “the tough choices” and be the “fair 
broker.” Many said they would reject anything that resembled a “trust me” approach on the part 
of the Executive Branch. One judge thought judges need to be “gadflies.”  (One judge remarked 
that he “never meet an Article III judge that would roll over or lay down for the Executive or 
Legislative Branch.”)  Several saw their obligation of inquiry related to the consequences of 
unreviewed government conduct on civil liberties and how the privilege compromises 
fundamental values within our system of justice, including access to the courts, notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to respond to information that affects rights or liberties. Several were 
concerned about government contractors or other private actors, particularly within the context 
of Jane’s case, who would attempt through the privilege to insulate themselves from claims 
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arising out of their own improper or unlawful conduct. In short, every judge expressed in some 
fashion the core belief that a court could not act or be perceived as acting as a “rubber stamp” or 
“blindly accepting” a privilege claim. And though judges felt challenged in varying degrees 
concerning their ability to understand and assess the complete contours of national security 
issues, judges generally believe that an adequately informed judge can assess whether national 
security claims are reasonable, while recognizing  that a judge, as one judge put it, “can always 
be fooled” through misinformation, 
On the other hand, no matter how probing their inquiry, judges recognize that their 
“independent check” on assertions of the state secrets privilege is, by its nature, a limited one 
whose scope is dictated by separation of powers principles.  Based on those principles, judges 
recognize in some fashion that there are tangible limits to the obligation or authority to assess 
risks to national security.  As a result, an inherent sense of restraint is embedded in their 
approach to a state secrets claim. In that regard, one experienced judge observed that he has 
developed a greater appreciation over the years for the complex nature of national security 
information.  Overall, even those judges most inclined to exercise an aggressive level of scrutiny 
thought that there inevitably comes a point when a judge must defer to plausible Executive 
Branch judgments about the risks and dangers to national security associated with the disclosure 
of information.  As one judge mentioned, reflecting the general sentiments of the group, he 
would not substitute his own “reasonable” judgments for “reasonable” Executive Branch 
judgments or “balance away” national security.  Reflecting a frustration associated with a 
compromised ability to address the merits of cases because of the privilege, some judges 
expressed the hope that some extra-judicial remedies would be available for meritorious claims 
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sacrificed in the name of nationals security, although they also expressed little optimism in that 
regard.  
b. Judges want a meaningful public record.  There were widely expressed concerns 
associated with the recognized need to proceed, for the most part, ex parte, in camera. In that 
regard, the judges generally thought it critical that a meaningful public record assures the public 
that an independent review had, in fact, occurred, particularly when it has case-ending 
consequences. Many judges thought it essential that that a public record identify the process that 
was used to consider the privilege and the issues that were considered  and decided, with the 
court’s decisions public as much as possible. For these reasons, the judges thought it important 
that unclassified opinions and orders be publicly docketed as much as possible in order to 
educate the public concerning the positions taken by the government..   
c. Judges give substantial weight to the judgments made at the highest levels of the 
Executive Branch. The judges generally had a high level of confidence that the Executive 
Branch was well-intentioned and asserted the privilege in good faith and not for purely litigation-
driven motives, other than to protect state secrets.  More specifically, judges were unanimous in 
their high regard for declarations provided by high ranking agency officials; and even judges 
with the highest levels of self- proclaimed skepticism concerning the accuracy of classification 
decisions in general are prepared to extend a high degree of credibility to the declarations of an 
agency head or the Attorney General, as opposed to “some local FBI guy.”  Several experienced 
judges remarked that they attach a great deal of significance to such declarations because they 
know that there is a rigorous internal agency process before a state secrets claim is presented to a 
court.   Indeed, judges with the most experience in dealing with national security issues and high 
ranking national security officials, and who were often the most demanding in their assessment 
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of a privilege claim, also had the highest level of confidence that a state secrets privilege would 
be asserted sparingly, in good faith and only after a rigorous internal consideration, although the 
scope might be initially too broad.  
Conversely, judges expect, as Reynolds contemplates, that a high level official and the 
Attorney General will, in fact, personally review whether the privilege should be asserted and 
will discount declarations from even such high ranking officials to the extent a judge thinks that 
the substance of the declarations is simply, as one judge put it, “bureaucratic routine.”  The  
judges ranged widely in their views concerning whether they would entertain challenges to 
claims that a senior official had, in fact, personally reviewed documents and the assertion of the 
privilege.    
d. Judges expect a high degree of candor and transparency.   Commensurate with their 
high regard for high level officials of the intelligence community, judges expect the Executive 
Branch to provide candid, complete and accurate information in support of a privilege claim.  
For many judges, this expectation is underscored by the ex parte, non-adversarial process that is 
used to assess the privilege. It is also reinforced by the widespread belief among the judges that 
the government overclassifies information, as well as for some, the possibility that the privilege 
might be asserted at the insistence of lower level officials for purely tactical litigation reasons or 
to conceal embarrassment or governmental wrongdoing.  Judges are therefore attuned to any 
perceived attempts at stonewalling, concealing, misleading or obstructing a judge’s ability to 
understand the basis for the privilege.  One judge expected the government to “put its cards on 
the table” with candid disclosures about the level of risk to national security associated with 
disclosure. One judge becomes “easily annoyed” with the government when it claims national 
security issues in a conclusory fashion without specificity. For these reasons, most judges, in 
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substance, wanted a clear, candid articulation concerning what specific information was claimed 
to be privileged and why it would endanger national security (“what is it that they’re actually 
saying needs to be protected.”) and then isolate precisely what part of that information would be 
essential to the government’s litigation position.  Likewise, judges generally mentioned, in one 
fashion or another, that they expect the government to provide enough information to allow them 
to understand “the overall picture” concerning why information was privileged, although for that 
purpose many judges did not think that a judge necessarily needed to see every piece of 
information. 
Consistent with these views, judges offered that intelligence gathering agencies would 
increase their credibility with the courts by providing more transparency concerning the 
qualifications of the people making the underlying judgments as to the claimed privileged 
information, including why certain information cannot be adequately protected through 
classification designations that provide less protections than the “absolute” protections afforded a 
“state secret.”  The interviewed judges also thought that the agencies would promote within the 
judiciary a higher level of confidence in their judgments by more openly and candidly sharing 
their thinking that demonstrated that they had in fact reached considered judgments after 
considering the range of competing considerations. 
e. Judges do not consider inadvertent disclosure as a result of ex parte, in camera 
review a significant risk. Contrary to the concerns often mentioned in published cases, the 
judges generally had very little concern about the judiciary’s ability to preserve the secrecy of 
information submitted for ex parte, in camera review.  (One judge responded to the question, 
“Do you have any concerns about  a judge’s or court’s ability to maintain the secrecy of 
documents submitted for in camera review? , with “ Heavens No!”),  Several remarked that in 
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their experience, leaks typically come from the Executive Branch itself for self-serving reasons. 
One judge with very substantial national security experience remarked that the Executive Branch 
always claims concerns about leaks resulting from submitting documents for judicial review, but 
can never point to any that have ever occurred, except by one of its own agencies.  
f. Judges are hesitant to dismiss cases based on the state secrets privilege.  Judges are 
inclined to search for alternatives to dismissal and not to impose case determinative 
consequences on the litigation because of the privilege, particularly dismissal before considering 
documents at issue in a specific evidentiary context. The judges mentioned in this regard the ex 
parte, non-adversarial process surrounding an assessment of the privilege and the impact it has 
on a litigant’s access to the courts. Likewise, judges resist the notion that certain claims must be 
dismissed outright as “non-justiciable” and naturally gravitate to a more flexible analysis 
concerning whether  a case can proceed in the face of a state secrets claim.  Many judges 
allowed, without subscribing to any particular approach, that they would attempt to explore any 
reasonable approach that affords a plaintiff an opportunity to present his case, “even if in less 
than an ideal manner,” and that dismissal should be regarded as “a last resort.” One judge 
offered, based on experience, that managing a case with that objective involves “a lot of work,” 
under-appreciated by “the uninitiated.” 
g. Judges think information is over classified. Judges think information generally is 
overly classified, particularly when done at relatively low levels of authority; and there is a 
widespread concern that, however well-intentioned, the assertion of national security-based 
privileges is sometimes influenced by a tendency to exaggerate the importance of information to 
national security. Judges see a widespread inability or unwillingness to distinguish between 
information whose disclosure would actually endanger the national security and information that 
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while sensitive enough to be protected in some fashion, would not endanger national security in 
any tangible or demonstrative way, were it disclosed and which could be adequately protected 
through CIPA-type procedures. For example, one judge saw a tendency for the government to 
invoke “national security” whenever there were more general “public safety” concerns. 
Similarly, several judges experienced instances where classified information made “a mountain 
out of a mole hill.” Some judges attributed this tendency to overzealousness, others to a “culture” 
within particular agencies and others to a myopic view of how the sensitivity of information 
should be measured. Some judges, based on their experience, both before and after becoming a 
judge, see a “mindset that flows down” to cause the assertion of unduly broad claims of 
privilege. Others thought that many classification decisions simply reflect the request of a field 
agent who is “invested” in a case and that the tendency is “when in doubt, classify.” For these 
reasons, some judges, based on their experience in law enforcement, thought that classification 
decisions should be, as matter of course, reviewed by more senior agency officials who do not 
have a bureaucratic stake in the decision other than to protect national security information.   
There were very mixed views on a judge’s authority to order disclosure of classified 
information not protected under the state secrets privilege.  Some judges thought that while a 
judge can pressure the government into making more limited claims of privilege, a judge should 
not require the government to provide classified information to even cleared parties or counsel 
over its objections.  Other judges saw in their inherent authority over cases the ability to sanction 
the Executive Branch like any other litigant who would disobey a court order, recognizing that 
its authority in that regard would need to be exercised cautiously.   
Many judges, including those who have dealt most often with these issues, saw no reason 
why a CIPA-type process could not be used in civil cases to allow a litigant to pursue claims as 
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much as possible.  These judges thought such procedures were appropriate not only to allow the 
use of classified information that is not a “state secret,” as some judges have, in fact, done, but 
also to facilitate the disclosure and use of state secrets information itself, although they 
recognized that such devices are not currently available. Some judges are “big fans” of cleared 
counsel, redactions and summaries, as authorized under CIPA and would favor congressional 
authorization to utilize such procedures with respect to state secrets in civil litigation. One judge 
mentioned the ombudsman arrangement currently authorized under FISA as a potential useful 
approach.  Overall, there was a widespread sentiment that Congress should formally authorize 
CIPA-type procedures in civil cases in order to allow for greater disclosure, not only for 
classified, but non-privileged, information, but also for state secrets information itself, including 
such devices as the use of cleared counsel and or “specialized counsel” along the lines authorized 
under recent amendments to the FISA.  
8.  Most judges were not receptive to the use of specialized courts or court appointed 
experts.  
 
As a general sentiment, the judges believe that with proper Executive Branch disclosures 
courts have the institutional competency to assess assertions of the state secrets privilege;  and 
while some judges thought specialized courts might be useful, most judges did not react 
favorably to their use, with nearly all judges expressing the sentiment that the “pluralism” of 
generalist judges best facilitates over time reaching proper answers to difficult questions.  Some 
judges were adamantly opposed to concentrating the consideration of state secrets issues in a 
particular court.  Some judges also doubted that judges appointed to a specialized court would 
have any greater expertise to assess these issues than any other federal judge unless such an 
assignment was an exclusive, long term assignment that allowed the development of a special 
expertise. On balance, the judges were skeptical about the role a specialized court could play in 
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assessing the state secrets privilege issues. One judge offered as “a point of pride” that federal 
judges are the “world’s last generalists” and that the country is better off without a “specialized 
judiciary.”   
Judges were divided over whether experts should be available to the court to assist in 
assessing a state secrets claim. Some judges thought access to a pool of cleared consultants with 
appropriate experience or court-appointed subject matter experts might be useful sources of 
assistance to a judge; but overall, the large majority of judges were not inclined to think that 
experts would be useful, feasible or even appropriate in determining whether information should 
be treated as state secrets.  Some thought using experts would be inconsistent with a judge’s 
“non-delegable” obligation to independently review the information at issue, likening the 
obligation to that involved in criminal sentencing.  Some observed that “what’s important is the 
judge’s judgment, not some expert’s.”  Some saw experts as a “crutch” to avoid the tough 
judgments. Others talked in terms of transparency (“We’re the ones selected to make, and who 
get paid to make decisions, whether good or bad.”). Many saw in providing sufficient 
information to experts the same intractable disclosure problems that exist with respect to even 
cleared counsel and therefore questioned whether an expert could ever be in a position to provide 
meaningful assistance because of an inability to access the necessary information. Some doubted 
that an expert would ever have any more competency than a properly briefed judge. (One judge 
quipped that in his experience “for every three experts, you get four opinions.”)   Some judges 
were skeptical about who any experts would be and where their loyalties would lie.  One judge 
remarked, based on his experience, that the types of people who would be among the pool of 
experts would be people who have retired from intelligence agencies and that there is a 
widespread belief that these former employees “never really leave the agency.”  In a similar vein, 
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another judge worried about “who these experts would be working for” and thought that they 
would inevitably have close ties to intelligence agencies.  Others thought, however, based on 
their own experience, that there are many people with intelligence experience who have the 
necessary reputations for integrity and independence to serve as helpful experts to the court.  
Conclusion 
At its core, this paper explores whether published opinions accurately reflect how judges 
go about dealing with national security cases, and state secrets privilege cases in particular. The 
responses of a relatively small, randomly selected group of federal judges cannot be considered 
representative of the federal judiciary as a whole, and this very preliminary and limited study 
does not allow for any definitive pronouncements concerning what actually influences judges in 
dealing with states secrets claims.  Nor does it allow any for any statistically meaningful 
conclusions concerning whether any particular background or experience correlates with how a 
particular judge will deal with a state secrets issue.  Nevertheless, the interviews, however 
limited, do suggest that some jurisprudential re-thinking and educational initiatives may be 
useful and appropriate.    
First, the current standard for recognizing a state secrets privilege - whether there is a 
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the 
interest of national security, should not be divulged - is so general that it provides almost no 
practical guidance as far as how to actually assess a state secrets claim. Similarly, the answers to 
many of the questions raised in the Introduction remain unclear and elusive, particularly those 
pertaining to the scope and substance of a judge’s inquiry into the factual basis for the privilege 
claim.  For example, there appears to be no clear view concerning how the “necessity” that 
triggers further inquiry under Reynolds actually defines what a judge should look at and for what 
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purpose.  Does that “necessity” simply require a Court to confirm that a “plausible” claim of 
privilege is actually supported by the underlying documents and information, or does it require 
some level of actual fact findings concerning whether information is “secret” and its disclosure 
would endanger national security?  How tangible or demonstrable must the risk of harm to 
national security be for information to receive its “absolute” protections under the privilege.  Is 
an articulable, but mostly theoretical, risk of danger to national security sufficient to foreclose 
entirely the adjudication of a claim?   
Similarly unclear is at what point does privileged information becomes so entangled with 
non-privileged information so as to remove access to even unprivileged information and 
effectively to create a Totten subject matter bar to adjudicating a claim.  In Reynolds, the 
Supreme Court endorsed taking the depositions of the surviving crew members as an acceptable 
alternative to the privileged investigative report without any expressed concern that these 
witnesses, who surely had first- hand knowledge of at least some of that privileged information, 
might inadvertently disclose that privileged information. Yet lower courts have dismissed cases 
for fear that privileged information might be disclosed through the gathering of non-privileged 
information no more closely tied to privileged information than in Reynolds.  Courts have 
struggled with these issues, particularly when confronted with substantial claims of constitutional 
infringements, and have questioned, at least implicitly through their efforts to find a way to 
adjudicate those claims, whether a private litigant, as opposed to the government, must always 
bear the consequences attendant a recognition of the privilege.  
Second, and perhaps because of these issues, there appears to be widespread support for 
extending into civil cases the same types of procedures authorized in criminal cases under CIPA. 
The most experienced judges interviewed, relying principally on their experience in criminal 
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cases, uniformly believed that in the vast majority of cases the iterative process authorized in  
CIPA would allow for civil cases to be litigated rather than dismissed, without any real threat to 
national security, even were the ultimate consequences different than in criminal cases when  
essential privileged information cannot be presented in an unclassified format.    
Third, there appears to be widespread support for more judicial education on how judges 
should actually work through state secrets claims. As reflected in the interviews, judges believe 
they become more adept at navigating through state secrets issues as they gain experience in 
dealing with classified information and national security claims; and they generally endorsed 
continuing judicial education that actually allowed judges to work through national security 
issues in specific case studies.  It may also be useful, as one experienced judge suggested, to 
develop “best practices” for a judge’s consideration.  
As issues related to the War on Terror continue to infuse themselves into the daily 
workings of society, from the methods and means of communication, data collection and storage 
to privacy issues and domestic and international travel, a wider array of judges from across the 
country will deal with assertions of the state secrets privilege with increasing frequency; and the 
difficulties and trade-offs embedded into the state secrets privilege in its present form will come 
into sharper focus for not only courts, but Congress and the general public.  As one judge 
perceptively observed more than three decades ago, “the successful assertion of a state-secrets 
privilege by the United States government results not only in the exclusion of the privileged 
information but also in an alteration in the usual rules by which courts allocate burdens of 
production and persuasion and according to which they ordered dismissal or summary 
judgment.”263   Notwithstanding this paper’s limitations, it is fair to suggest that whatever their 
disposition concerning the privilege, judges feel challenged in this jurisprudential environment, 
263 Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 268 (4th Cir. 1980) (Murnaghan, J.). 
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which, perhaps unlike any other, requires case deciding judgments about “risk” based on 
“plausibilities” and “deference” rather than demonstrated likelihoods or causality.  They see in 
the “absolute” nature of the privilege a not totally comprehensible break with the long 
recognized and relied upon judicial mechanisms for adjudicating claims in a way that balances 
and accommodates as best as possible all relevant considerations.  As a result, and as the actual 
instances of domestic terrorism increase, judges seem to be very much caught up in the 
“Lincolnian tension between principle and expediency.”264  Judges, as well as the Academy265 
and Congress,266 continue to engage in a critical analysis of this jurisprudence; and the most 
recent pronouncements by Supreme Court Justices may infuse more neutral principles into the 
process of adjudicating the state secrets privilege.267  Inextricably connected to the larger on-
going debate concerning the role of the judiciary in the War of Terrorism, the state secrets 
privilege will no doubt be shaped by developments within that larger context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
264 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH – THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS, 68 
(1962). 
265 See, e.g., David Rudenstine, The Irony of a Faustian Bargain: Reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s 1953 
United States v. Reynolds Decision, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1283 (2013); Galit Raguan, Masquerading Justiciability: 
The Misapplication of the State Secrets Privilege in Mohamed v. Jeppesen--Reflections from a Comparative 
Perspective, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423 (2012); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in 
Chief at the Lowest Ebb--Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 
(2008); Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Liberties and the War on Terrorism, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2005).  
266 See, e.g., Senate Report 110-442 – State Secrets Protection Act, available at https://www.congress.gov/congress- 
ional-report/110th-congress/senate-report/442/1.  
267 See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478 (2011); see also Kerry v Din, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 
2128, 2147 (2015) (Breyer, Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, J., dissenting from the plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
presence of security considerations does not suspend the Constitution.  Rather, it requires us to take security needs 
into account when determining, for example, what ‘process’ is ‘due.’”) (citations omitted). 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
 
The following is an outline of the questions that served as the basic structure for the interviews.  
 
1) Background 
 
a. How long have you been a federal judge? When were you appointed? 
 
b. How many cases have you handled in which the state secrets privilege has been 
asserted? 
 
c. Have you ever served in the military? 
 
d. Before becoming a federal judge, did you have occasion to deal with classified 
information or national security issues? 
 
e. Have you been involved in other national security cases where the state secrets 
privilege was not asserted? What about cases involving CIPA proceedings? 
 
f. Before becoming a federal judge, did you have any experience as a prosecutor or 
criminal defense counsel? 
 
g.  As a general proposition, what level of confidence do you have that the Executive 
Branch appropriately asserts the state secrets privilege or claims of national 
security? 
 
2) Judicial Approach 
 
a. What information should a judge ask for in deciding whether information is 
protected under the state secrets privilege? 
 
b. Should a judge go beyond obtaining information facially sufficient to support the 
privilege or should a court engage in a more substantive analysis of the 
information? And if so, what information should a court ask for to determine 
independently whether certain information, if disclosed, would endanger national 
security? 
 
c. To what extent do you think there is a risk of public disclosure of state secrets 
through ex parte filings under seal and in camera review?  
 
d. How should a judge go about assessing the risks associated with the disclosure of 
information pertaining to national security? 
 
e. At what point, and upon what showing of necessity, should or must a court defer 
to the judgment of the Executive Branch that no disclosure of any kind should 
occur (even at the expense of a case’s dismissal)?  For example, the risk of 
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disclosure in some cases may be obvious, such as the identity of targets and 
participants in on-going investigations, but how should the court go about 
assessing risk where the risk of disclosure is unclear (such as where the 
information deals with historical facts in past investigations)? 
 
f. Should a court balance those risks against the rights of a litigant? 
 
g. Should a judge consider whether procedural devices used to protect sensitive law 
enforcement and other information in other contexts (such as protective orders, 
filings under seal, cleared counsel, and “attorneys’ eyes only” disclosure) would 
adequately protect information to take it out of the category of state secrets, which 
cannot be disclosed to an adverse party in any fashion? 
 
3) Resources and Reform  
 
a. What level of institutional competence do you think courts have to independently 
assess executive judgments about whether a claimed state secret is in fact a state 
secret whose disclosure may endanger national security? 
 
b. Are there any resources or procedures that might better allow a court to 
independently assess the validity of a state secrets claim?  For example, would the 
use of experts or specialized courts make any sense? 
 
c. Do you think it would be helpful for Congress to enact legislation that codifies the 
state secrets privilege or procedures for dealing with state secrets in civil litigation 
as it has done for criminal cases through CIPA? 
 
      4)    Jane’s case 
 
       a,    How would you approach Jane’s case.  
 
       b.    What relief would be appropriate/possible.   
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Appendix B: Summary Chart of Interviewed Judges 
 
 Years Gender President Law Enforcement Criminal Defense Military National Security 
       State 
Secrets CIPA 
A 14 Male G.W. Bush Y N Y Y Y 
B 11 Male G.W. Bush N Y N N Y 
C 12 Male G.W. Bush Y N Y Y Y 
D 22 Female Clinton Y N N Y Y 
E 34 Male Reagan Y N Y Y Y 
F 5 Female Obama N N N N N 
G 11 Female G.W. Bush Y N N Y Y 
H 7 Male G.W. Bush N N N N Y 
I 21 Male Clinton N Y N Y Y 
J 34 Male Reagan N Y Y Y Y 
K 29 Male Reagan N N Y Y Y 
L 3 Male Obama Y Y Y N Y 
M 21 Male Clinton Y Y Y Y Y 
N 30 Male Reagan Y N N N Y 
O 25 Male H.W. Bush N N Y N Y 
P 13 Male G.W. Bush Y N N Y Y 
Q 13 Male G.W. Bush N N N N Y 
R 28 Male Reagan Y N Y Y Y 
S 10 Female Obama Y N N N Y 
T 17 Male Clinton N Y N Y Y 
U 14 Male G.W. Bush Y N N Y Y 
V 20 Male Clinton N N N N Y 
W 19 Male Clinton N N Y N Y 
X 8 Male G.W. Bush Y N Y N Y 
Y 23 Male H.W. Bush N N Y N Y 
Z 15 Female Clinton Y Y N Y Y 
AA 23 Female H.W. Bush N N N N Y 
BB 24 Male H.W. Bush Y N Y N Y 
CC 12 Female G.W. Bush N N N N Y 
DD 15 Male Clinton Y N N Y Y 
EE 36 Female Carter N N N N Y 
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